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Abstract 
 
The Department of Defense‘s space acquisition enterprise has experienced 
numerous challenges since the advent of space power.  Space borne capabilities are 
needed now more than ever, but space acquisition programs frequently fail to meet cost 
and schedule goals.  The decades of space acquisition experience form a rich history that 
can be used to build a leading indicator of program success and serve as an enabler 
toward effective program execution.  First, the space acquisition areas of greatest concern 
were determined to be cost, schedule and requirements.  These areas can be considered as 
systems that are composed of the people, processes and products that work together to 
execute the program.  Their effective interoperation is vital toward achieving program 
success.  Second, the vital interoperation characteristics, or attributes that each system 
must possess to be successful, can be extracted from past space acquisition lessons 
learned and placed into an interoperability maturity model.  The maturity model can then 
be used to capture the relative maturity of the program‘s major systems and their ability 
to interoperate within the context of each critical characteristic.  Third, the maturity 
model forms the basis for an interoperability measurement using the method developed 
by Dr. Thomas Ford, where higher levels of interoperability maturity will result in a 
higher interoperability score.  Finally, this process is demonstrated with three recent 
space programs.  This application demonstrates how the interoperability score can be 
used as a leading indicator with interpretive analysis provided. 
 
v 
Acknowledgments 
 
I am extremely thankful and indebted to my advisor, Dr. Colombi, for his 
patience, thoughtful discourse, and sage guidance.  I also extend my deep gratitude to Dr. 
Ford for his important, inaugural work, and for giving me a foundation to build upon.  I 
must thank Col Huntley for providing ample schedule pressure, but more importantly, 
looking out for my best interests.  I also thank Lt Col Bythewood for his invaluable 
leadership and mentorship during this time.  Finally, to my friends and family, you keep 
me running. 
  
 
       Jason T. Shibata 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Acknowledgments................................................................................................................v 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................x 
I. Introduction ......................................................................................................................1 
Background...................................................................................................................1 
Hypotheses/Research Objectives ..................................................................................3 
Methodology.................................................................................................................4 
Assumptions/Limitations ..............................................................................................4 
Implications ..................................................................................................................5 
Preview .........................................................................................................................5 
II. Literature Review ............................................................................................................7 
Chapter Overview .........................................................................................................7 
Ford‘s Interoperability Measurement Method ..............................................................8 
Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI) ..............................................14 
Organizational Interoperability Maturity Model (OIM).............................................18 
Ford‘s Method Applied to OIM .................................................................................21 
Space Acquisition Failures and Lessons Learned ......................................................22 
Leading Indicators ......................................................................................................30 
Summary.....................................................................................................................34 
III.  Methodology ...............................................................................................................35 
 
vii 
Page 
Chapter Overview .......................................................................................................35 
Space Acquisition Interoperability .............................................................................35 
Requirements-to-Schedule Interoperability ................................................................37 
Schedule-to-Requirements Interoperability................................................................37 
Requirements-to-Cost Interoperability .......................................................................38 
Cost-to-Requirements Interoperability .......................................................................38 
Schedule-to-Cost Interoperability ..............................................................................38 
Cost-to-Schedule Interoperability ..............................................................................39 
Space Acquisition Interoperability Characters ...........................................................39 
Incorporating Interoperability Lessons Learned Into a Maturity Model ....................42 
Maturity Model Levels ...............................................................................................42 
The Space Acquisition Interoperability Maturity Model (SAIMM) ..........................43 
Summary.....................................................................................................................45 
IV.  Analysis and Results ...................................................................................................46 
Chapter Overview .......................................................................................................46 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System ............................................47 
National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (NPOESS) .................51 
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High .............................................................53 
Interpreting the Results...............................................................................................62 
Summary.....................................................................................................................65 
V.  Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................67 
Conclusions of Research ............................................................................................67 
 
viii 
Page 
Recommendations for Future Research......................................................................68 
Summary.....................................................................................................................71 
Appendix A – Independent Assessments of AEHF, NPOESS and SBIRS High ..............74 
Appendix B – Space Acquisition Cost and Schedule Challenges .....................................80 
Appendix C – A Summary of Space Acquisition Findings and Root Causes ...................83 
Appendix D – Recommendations for Space Acquisition Improvement ............................99 
Appendix E – Excerpts from the Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Guide .........102 
Appendix F – SAIMM Interoperability Measurement Checklist ....................................108 
Step 1 – Determine Program Interoperation Maturity ..............................................108 
Step 2 – Instantiate the Program Character States ....................................................108 
Step 3 – Perform the Interoperability Measurement ................................................108 
Step 4 – Evaluate the Results ...................................................................................108 
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................109 
 
ix 
List of Figures 
Page 
Figure 1.  Interoperability Measurement Process (Ford, 2008) .......................................... 9 
Figure 2.  Directional Interoperability (Ford, 2008) ......................................................... 12 
Figure 3.  Space Life Cycle Cost Curve (Hamel, 2007) ................................................... 24 
Figure 4.  Space Acquisition Scenario (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003) .......................................................... 25 
Figure 5.  Depiction of a Leading Indicator (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) ......................................................................................... 31 
Figure 6.  Requirements Trends Example (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) ......................................................................................... 33 
Figure 7.  Space Acquisition Systems (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003) .......................................................... 36 
Figure 8.  Space Program Cost Growth (Government Accountability Office, 2010) ....... 80 
Figure 9.  Space Program Unit Cost Growth (Government Accountability Office, 2010)
 .................................................................................................................................... 81 
Figure 10.  Space Program Schedule Delays (Government Accountability Office, 2010)
 .................................................................................................................................... 82 
 
x 
List of Tables 
Page 
Table 1.  Interoperability Characters (Ford, 2008) ........................................................... 11 
Table 2.  LISI Attributes (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004) .................................................... 15 
Table 3.  LISI Maturity Levels (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004) .......................................... 16 
Table 4.  LISI Reference Model (Ford, 2008) .................................................................. 17 
Table 5.  OIM (Clark & Jones) ......................................................................................... 20 
Table 6.  INTERFET Instantiation (Ford, 2008) .............................................................. 21 
Table 7.  INTERFET Interoperability Measurement (Ford, 2008) ................................... 22 
Table 8.  Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Overview (truncated) (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) .................................................. 32 
Table 9.  SAIMM .............................................................................................................. 44 
Table 10.  AEHF SAIMM, 2003 ...................................................................................... 48 
Table 11.  AEHF Instantiation, 2003 ................................................................................ 49 
Table 12.  AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2003 .................................................... 49 
Table 13.  AEHF SAIMM, 2010 ...................................................................................... 50 
Table 14.  AEHF Instantiation, 2010 ................................................................................ 50 
Table 15.  AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2010 .................................................... 51 
Table 16.  NPOESS SAIMM, 2009 .................................................................................. 52 
Table 17.  NPOESS Instantiation, 2009............................................................................ 52 
Table 18.  NPOESS Interoperability Measurement, 2009 ................................................ 53 
Table 19.  SBIRS SAIMM, 2003 ...................................................................................... 55 
 
xi 
Page 
Table 20.  SBIRS Instantiation, 2003 ............................................................................... 55 
Table 21.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2003 .................................................... 56 
Table 22.  Independent Program Assessment (Government Accountability Office, 2008)
 .................................................................................................................................... 58 
Table 23.  SBIRS SAIMM, 2008 ...................................................................................... 59 
Table 24.  SBIRS Instantiation, 2008 ............................................................................... 59 
Table 25.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2008 .................................................... 60 
Table 26.  SBIRS SAIMM, 2010 ...................................................................................... 61 
Table 27.  SBIRS Instantiation, 2010 ............................................................................... 61 
Table 28.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2010 .................................................... 62 
Table 29.  AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2003 .................................................... 62 
Table 30.  AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2010 .................................................... 63 
Table 31.  NPOESS Interoperability Measurement, 2009 ................................................ 63 
Table 32.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2003 .................................................... 64 
Table 33.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2008 .................................................... 64 
Table 34.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2010 .................................................... 65 
Table 35.  Space Acquisition Lessons Learned ................................................................ 83 
Table 36.  Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Overview (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) .................................................................. 102 
Table 37.  Leading Indicator Specification Example (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) .................................................................. 104 
 
xii 
Page 
Table 38.  Instantiation Example Format ........................................................................ 108 
 
1 
A SPACE ACQUISITION LEADING INDICATOR 
 
BASED ON SYSTEM INTEROPERATION MATURITY 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The U.S. Army is one of the largest users of space-based capabilities in DOD. As the 
Army transforms, its operational characteristics will, in large part, be achieved through 
the use and exploitation of transformational space systems. This dependency requires the 
Army to actively participate in defining space related capability needs that ensure 
necessary force structure and systems are developed and acquired to enable the land 
force to conduct the full range of military operations now and in the future. 
 
—Army Space Policy (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009) 
Background 
There is little doubt that the tenets of network centric warfare provide military 
forces a decided advantage on the battlefield.  Robustly networked forces share 
information and collaborate resulting in synchronized battlespace effects, greater speed of 
command, and increased lethality, survivability and responsiveness (Department of 
Defense, 2001).  The ability to connect and interoperate between people and forces is a 
necessary condition toward enabling mission effectiveness in virtually any collaborative 
environment, including acquisition. 
Interoperability has grown within the defense community from a buzzword to a 
mandatory system requirement.  Despite its importance, the study of interoperability 
measurement has been disparate and remains largely unproven.  Most interoperability 
measurement methods focus on qualitative means rather than quantitative, and no one 
method has been accepted as the de facto standard.  In 2007, there were over 30 distinct 
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definitions, over 60 types and at least 14 interoperability measurement models in 
existence (Ford, Colombi, Graham, & Jacques, 2007). 
The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) approach to interoperability is manifested in 
the Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter (NR-KPP) and requires that joint systems 
adhere to compliant solution architectures, the Net-Centric Data and Services Strategy, 
technical standards and interfaces through the Global Information Grid (GIG) Technical 
Guidance, DOD Information Assurance (IA) requirements, and DOD supportability 
requirements (CJCSI, 2008).  The NR-KPP provides a framework and data strategy to 
enable interoperability, but does not specify how to measure interoperability nor does it 
establish interoperability performance standards. 
Similarly, the DOD‘s space acquisition community does not have a way to 
quantifiably measure the effectiveness of its acquisition programs‘ interoperations.  It 
generally uses a series of gates and reviews that demand various levels of program 
maturity and rigor.  These gates and reviews enforce good acquisition discipline and, in 
theory, provide the program with the best chance to deliver capability to the warfighter in 
a time confident manner.  Although the term interoperability may seem foreign when 
viewed from within the acquisition process, the major forces that affect the outcome of an 
acquisition program; organizations/people, processes, information and systems, must 
indeed be interoperable with one another and aligned toward a common purpose. 
Major Thomas Ford‘s seminal work supplied the first quantifiable method for 
interoperability measurement (Ford, 2008), and formed the initial links between 
interoperability measurement and operational mission effectiveness.  He introduced the 
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concept of ―confrontational interoperability‖ where interoperability is measured between 
two opposing systems, and where one system‘s ability to control the other results in a 
higher degree of operational mission effectiveness. 
This thesis is founded on Ford‘s inaugural work, and extends his ideas further into 
the realm of collaborative interoperability within the context of space acquisition.  As 
implied by the opening quote, there is a distinct tie between the ability to interoperate and 
operational mission effectiveness.  This paper asserts that the same relationships exist 
within an acquisition program, where greater acquisition interoperability results in an 
increased ability to meet requirements on time and on schedule.  A method to measure 
space acquisition interoperability is presented and provides the initial building blocks 
toward a quantifiable means to assess and even predict space acquisition performance. 
Hypotheses/Research Objectives 
The lessons learned from past space acquisition failures can be used to determine 
how a program‘s cost, schedule and requirements interoperate to produce a particular 
outcome.  These relationships and characteristics can be extracted, placed into a maturity 
model, and then evaluated using Ford‘s interoperability measurement method to create an 
indicator of effective acquisition interoperation.  This measurement method can then be 
applied to current and future acquisition programs to indicate or predict to what degree 
the components of a program interoperate.  The measure incorporates the benefit of 
hindsight to determine whether or not the program is likely to achieve its requirements on 
time and on schedule based upon its individual components‘ ability to interoperate. 
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Methodology 
The research method first examines past space acquisition failures for key factors 
or characters that dominated the program‘s eventual outcome.  These failures can then be 
used to compose an acquisition maturity model founded upon earlier works such as the 
Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI) model and the Organizational 
Interoperability Maturity Model (OIM). 
Finally, a measure of acquisition effectiveness will be developed and applied 
using Ford‘s work and the aforementioned acquisition maturity model. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
The intent of this work is to determine the crucial acquisition characteristics that 
should be specifically considered when measuring acquisition interoperability.  These 
characteristics will be developed based on past lessons learned, and will be subjective in 
nature.  The measurement will reward a greater maturity level in a key characteristic, but 
cannot explain exactly how much was gained because of it.  For instance, an acquisition 
failure may be caused by funding instability, but no quantifiable method exists to 
determine exactly how much the schedule, cost and performance were impacted. 
Additionally, Ford‘s work described how the need for interoperability varies with 
time.  A thorough examination of the time-dependencies of acquisition interoperability is 
not presented here but is a good candidate for future research. 
Lastly, this thesis will only examine interoperability within the specific context of 
space acquisition.  It is likely that the ideas presented in this paper are relevant to other 
contexts; however those aspects will not be addressed here.  It is believed that these vital 
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interoperability aspects at their core are universal and are necessary factors to enable 
collaborative interoperability between systems and forces.  Therefore, the lessons learned 
from the space acquisition domain could serve as relevant factors for interoperability in 
any domain at their highest level of extraction. 
Implications 
The space acquisition maturity model and acquisition interoperability 
measurement supply an initial approach to quantify whether or not a space program will 
be effective.  In other words, the measurement can help predict how likely the program 
will succeed in accomplishing the required level of performance within cost and schedule 
constraints – a leading indicator.  This method could be used to evaluate a program‘s 
maturity and progress throughout its lifecycle, and potentially flag program risk areas 
before they are realized. 
Preview 
The literature review will provide background essential to understanding Ford‘s 
interoperability measurement method, interoperability maturity models, and how the 
models can be used to facilitate interoperability measurements.  An examination of the 
key areas (systems) involved in and driving causes of space acquisition failures follows. 
The methodology section fuses the concepts and information from the literature 
review to demonstrate a method to measure space acquisition interoperability.  An 
acquisition interoperability maturity model will be built based upon the key and driving 
causes of space acquisition failures.   
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In the analysis and results chapter, the space acquisition maturity model will be 
used to measure the interoperability of several space programs by means of Ford‘s 
interoperability measurement method and will discuss the use of the measurements as a 
leading indicator of space acquisition effectiveness. 
The conclusions and recommendations section will examine the results of the 
aforementioned interoperability measure as a leading indicator and will discuss the utility 
of a leading indicator with respect to ongoing and future space programs.  Suggestions 
for future research and maturation of the leading indicator will follow. 
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II. Literature Review 
“…a process and procedure for establishing goals for improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of government agencies operations and the 
ability to deliver goods and services to the public using Information 
Technology. The goals must be measurable.”  
 —Clinger Cohen Act, Public Law 104-106 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of Ford‘s method, 
interoperability maturity models, and past space acquisition failures and their root causes.  
This literature review lays the foundation for the development of an acquisition 
effectiveness maturity model and later, a quantifiable method for measuring space 
acquisition interoperability.  A review of leading indicators for DOD acquisition 
programs will also be discussed to validate the utility of the interoperability 
measurement. 
The literature review first provides a brief summary of the foundational works 
that this paper relies and builds upon.  The basic tenets of Ford‘s interoperability 
measurement method and the interoperability maturity models are essential knowledge to 
understand the concepts and applications presented in this thesis.  A summary of past 
space acquisition failures follows.  Various sources were used to identify the root causes 
of the space acquisition failures of the past, and these root causes will later serve as chief 
contributors to an acquisition interoperability maturity model in the methodology section 
of this paper. 
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Before beginning, it is critically important that a standard definition of the term 
―interoperability‖ is provided.  Ford‘s paper, the 2007 survey on interoperability 
measurement, LISI and OIM chose to use the DOD‘s original definition from Joint 
Publication 1-02 (Department of Defense, 2005) as the standard.  It states that 
interoperability is ―the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and 
accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged 
to enable them to operate effectively together‖ (Ford, Colombi, Graham, & Jacques, 
2007).  This thesis will remain consistent with this definition. 
Ford’s Interoperability Measurement Method 
Ford created a method to measure confrontational interoperability based on and 
constrained by an operational scenario and the systems and processes that execute the 
activities contained in the scenario.  Ford‘s basic process to define the interoperability 
measurement can be described by the figure below, taken from Ford‘s earlier work: 
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Figure 1.  Interoperability Measurement Process (Ford, 2008) 
The first step in Ford‘s interoperability measurement process is to define the 
purpose of the measurement.  Defining the purpose is necessary to adequately scope the 
interoperability measurement, and serves as the anchor for the interoperability analysis.  
Once the purpose has been determined, the process that serves or is the subject of the 
purpose must be developed.  In Ford‘s method and this paper, operational scenarios 
defined the process for analysis.  In this paper, acquisition programs will provide the 
processes for analysis. 
According to Defense Acquisition University, Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
are ―a measure of operational success that must be closely related to the objective of the 
mission or operation being evaluated.  For example, the number of enemy submarines 
sunk or enemy tanks destroyed may be satisfactory MOEs if the objective is to destroy 
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such weapons systems...A meaningful MOE must be quantifiable and a measure to what 
degree the real objective is achieved.‖  Ford‘s work was chiefly focused on 
confrontational interoperability which used MOEs based on the effectiveness of friendly, 
or ―blue‖ forces compared against the effectiveness of enemy, or ―red‖ forces (e.g. 
number of enemy submarines sunk).  Collaborative interoperability on the other hand will 
use MOEs based on the effectiveness of friendly systems to operate with each other (e.g. 
number of successful communications messages sent and/or received). 
Many definitions of the word ―system‖ exist, but this research will maintain 
Ford‘s definition of a system as, ―an entity comprised of related interacting elements, 
which act together to achieve a purpose‖ and is ―broad enough to include a wide variety 
of systems including, but not limited to, technical, biological, environmental, 
organizational, conceptual, physical, and philosophical, among others.‖ (Ford, 2008).  
This broad view is critical to developing a flexible method to measure interoperability 
and can be applied to the space acquisition domain.  The notation for a set of systems is S 
= {s1, s2…sn} where S represents the complete set of systems participating in the 
operational scenario, and sn represents the individual systems. 
Once the operational scenario and systems have been chosen, the interoperability 
characters must be defined.  At a high level, characters describe salient and distinct 
attributes of a system (e.g. size, shape, function, etc.).  The notation for characters is X = 
{x1, x2…xn} where X represents the set of characters used to model the systems, and xn 
represents the characters used to describe the individual systems.  The states of these 
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characters (e.g. the character ―size‖ could have a state of ―25 ft‖), is noted as C = {c1, 
c2…cn} and follows Ford‘s formal definition: 
DEFINITION (System Characterization): Given a set of systems S, then X : S  
C is a function which maps systems to a set of character states C and X is called 
the characterization of S.  (Ford, 2008) 
For interoperability measurement, only certain types of characters, known as 
interoperability characters, are used.  These characters describe how the systems in the 
scenario interoperate, and are generally based on the actions the systems must perform to 
or accept from each other.  These interactions, much like a conversation between two 
people, have two primary components.  One party transmits the action, the other receives 
it.  Ford‘s work provides a table of potential interoperability characters: 
Table 1.  Interoperability Characters (Ford, 2008) 
 
In Ford‘s method, the states of these interoperability characters are usually 
denoted using absence or presence states.  That is, C = {0,1} where ―zero‖ indicates the 
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absence and ―one‖ indicates the presence of a specific interoperability character.  Ford‘s 
interoperability characters also capture the direction of the interoperation.  A 
conversation between two people is directional in nature.  One person is transmitting 
(speaking) a message in the direction of the other person, who is receiving (listening) the 
transmitted message.  A conversation between two people could be described as a ―bi-
directional interoperation‖ because both parties are able to transmit and receive messages.  
If one person was mute or deaf, the interoperability between the conversational parties 
could be described as a ―uni-directional interoperation‖ because only one party is able to 
transmit while the other can only receive.  Ford captured these relationships graphically: 
 
Figure 2.  Directional Interoperability (Ford, 2008) 
Once the systems and their characters are defined for a specific operational 
scenario and interoperability measurement purpose, they are ―instantiated‖ or listed as a 
sequence of states for each system.  For example, an aircraft could have characters of 
―type‖, ―load‖ and ―speed‖, and could be instantiated as a fighter jet with a weapons 
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capacity of 10,000 pounds and a maximum speed of 1,200 miles per hour (fighter, 
10,000 pounds, 1,200 mph). 
DEFINITION (System Instantiation): Given a specific s ∈ S and a set x ⊆ X of system 
characters descriptive of s, then x(s) is a sequence of system character states, 
called the instantiation of s, which models s.  (Ford, 2008) 
Ford‘s interoperability measurement is based on a mathematical similarity 
measurement.  To put it simply, a similarity measurement is based upon distance.  Items 
that are similar have less distance, and items that are disparate have more distance 
between them.  There are various types of similarity measurements, and Ford chose to 
use the Minkowski similarity function to base his analysis of interoperability 
measurement upon.  This function enables interoperability measurement between 
multiple systems based upon shared interoperability characters that have been instantiated 
and aligned.  Ford captures the SimReal interoperability measurement as follows: 
  
Equation 1.  Average Character State Value (Ford, 2008) 
   
1 1
max
   
2
n n
i i
i i
Average Character State Value w
nc
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEFINITION ( RealSim ): Given a pair of systems ,s s   instantiated as 
 max, 0,
n c     , then RealI Sim w MMS   , written out 
completely in [equation 2] is an interoperability function which gives a 
weighted, normalized measure of the similarity of systems instantiated 
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with real-valued character states where w  is the average character state 
value of a pair of system instantiations, MMS is the Modified Minkowski 
Similarity function, n  is the number of characters used to instantiate 
,   , maxc  is the maximum character state value, and r  is the 
Minkowski parameter (usually set to 2r  ). 
Equation 2.  SimReal Interoperability Measurement (Ford, 2008) 
       
1
1 1Re
1 max
max
11
2
n n r rn
i ial ir
i
i ii i
I Sim b
cnnc
  
 

                                
 
   
Ford‘s axiom further states: 
AXIOM (System Similarity and Interoperability):  If a pair of systems is 
instantiated only with system interoperability characters, then the measure of 
their similarity is also a measure of their interoperability.  (Ford, 2008) 
Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI) 
The LISI model was designed to measure information systems‘ interoperability by 
determining the degree of interoperability achieved by systems or organizations (Kasunic 
& Anderson, 2004).  In short, it is a maturity model.  The model uses four main 
―attributes of interoperability‖ (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004) to compose the framework 
used to measure interoperability; procedures, applications, infrastructure, and data, also 
known as PAID. 
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Table 2.  LISI Attributes (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004) 
 
The PAID attributes make up the columns of the LISI reference model.  The rows in the 
model define the level of interoperability maturity and are defined by the following (in 
order of increasing maturity); isolated, connected, functional, domain and enterprise. 
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Table 3.  LISI Maturity Levels (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004) 
 
The combination of the interoperability attributes with the interoperability maturity levels 
results in the LISI reference framework: 
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Table 4.  LISI Reference Model (Ford, 2008) 
 
Referencing back to Ford‘s method and the standard definition of interoperability, 
LISI provides a way to qualify how well systems provide and use services between one 
another to operate effectively.  The ―attributes of interoperability,‖ or PAID, describe key 
characteristics necessary for interoperability to occur.  In other words, the attributes are 
the means by which the services are provided; they enable interoperability.  The levels 
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provide the characters‘ states where higher levels of maturity will result in higher levels 
of interoperability. 
The LISI model provides a good way to measure the overall interoperability 
maturity of a particular system.  It does not however, guarantee interoperability between 
systems.  Two systems possessing identical maturity levels as defined by LISI will not 
interoperate if they use disparate technology, standards or interfaces.  As Ford points out, 
the LISI model‘s strength lies in its ability to facilitate a quantifiable interoperability 
measurement (Ford, 2008). 
Organizational Interoperability Maturity Model (OIM) 
The model known as OIM was born from and uses the same basic structure as the 
LISI model, but instead deals with interoperability between organizations.  Instead of the 
PAID attributes, OIM utilizes the attributes of preparedness, understanding, command 
style and ethos: 
Preparedness: This attribute describes the preparedness of the organisation to 
interoperate. It is made up of doctrine, experience and training. 
 
Understanding: The understanding attribute measures the amount of 
communication and sharing of knowledge and information within the organisation 
and how the information is used. 
 
Command Style: This is the attribute that describes the management and 
command style of the organisation – how decisions are made and how roles and 
responsibilities are allocated/delegated. 
 
Ethos: The ethos attribute is concerned with the culture and value systems of the 
organisation and the goals and aspiration of the organisation. The level of trust 
within the organisation is also included.  (Clark & Jones) 
 
The levels of organizational interoperability maturity again follow the LISI model‘s lead: 
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Level 0 - Independent - The Level 0 interoperability describes the interaction 
between independent organisations. These are organisations that would normally 
work without any interaction other than that provided by personal contact. They 
are likely to be organisations that do not normally share common goals or purpose 
but that may be required to interoperate in some scenario that has no precedent. 
Essentially the arrangements are unplanned and unanticipated. 
 
Level 1 - Ad hoc - At this level of interoperability only very limited 
organisational frameworks are in place which could support ad hoc arrangements. 
There will be some guidelines to describe how interoperability will occur but 
essentially the specific arrangements are still unplanned.  There will be some 
overarching shared goal but individual organisation aspirations will take 
precedence and the organisations remain entirely distinct. 
 
Level 2 - Collaborative - The collaborative organisational interoperability level 
is where recognised frameworks are in place to support interoperability and 
shared goals are recognized and roles and responsibilities are allocated as part of 
on-going responsibilities however the organisations are still distinct. Training is 
likely to have taken place in some aspects of the interworking and significant 
communication and sharing of knowledge does occur but the home organisations' 
frameworks still have a significant influence. 
 
Level 3 - Integrated - The integrated level of organisational interoperability is 
one where there are shared value systems and shared goals, a common 
understanding and a preparedness to interoperate, for example, detailed doctrine is 
in place and there is significant experience in using it. The frameworks are in 
place and practised however there are still residual attachments to a home 
organisation. 
 
Level 4 - Unified - A unified organisation is one in which the organisational 
goals, value systems, command structure/style, and knowledge bases are shared 
across the system. The organisation is interoperating on continuing basis. This is 
really the ideal level where there is no impediment in the organisational 
frameworks to full and complete interoperation. It is likely to occur only in very 
homogeneous organisations.  (Clark & Jones) 
 
The organizational attributes and maturity levels are combined to form the OIM: 
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Table 5.  OIM (Clark & Jones) 
 
The creators of OIM note that LISI is ―strongly technological‖ and ―focuses on 
system and technical compatibility,‖ and that OIM was created to ―look at the layers of 
the model that deal with organizational issues‖ (Clark & Jones).  They further delineate 
the differences between interoperability that is driven by process versus technology: 
Where interoperability has been driven by process, the focus is on the situation, 
the people and commander's intent. 
 
Where interoperability has been driven by technology, the focus is on assets, their 
properties and the levels of compatibility required. 
 
Therefore, OIM qualitatively assesses organizational interoperability by measuring the 
maturity of an organization‘s processes, their situation, the people involved and the 
commander‘s intent.  These focus areas are characterized by the attributes of 
preparedness, understanding, command style and ethos.  Again, the attributes are the 
means by which the services from the definition of interoperability are provided, where 
increased levels of maturity in each attribute area fundamentally result in an increase in 
interoperability.  While the attributes of preparedness, understanding, command style and 
ethos are highly relevant to an operational commander and their troops‘ interoperation, 
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other attributes may be selected to properly characterize a highly collaborative, non-
combat acquisition system. 
Ford’s Method Applied to OIM 
Ford applied his interoperability measurement to the maturity model, in this case 
OIM, to provide a way to quantifiably measure the interoperability between coalition 
nations.  An INTERFET coalition exercise was used to execute the measurement where 
the systems (S) were the nations, their characters (X) were the attributes of preparedness, 
understanding, command style, and ethos, and their character states (C) were represented 
by the five levels of the maturity model (Ford, 2008): 
S = {AUS,US,NZ,Thai,Phil,ROK} 
X = {Preparedness,Understanding,Command Style,Ethos} 
C = {0,1,2,3,4} 
Using maturity level assessments derived from the INTERFET exercise, the instantiation 
of S, X, and C yielded: 
Table 6.  INTERFET Instantiation (Ford, 2008) 
 
2 3 3 1
2 3 3 1
2 3 3 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
Preparation Understanding Command Style Ethos
AUS
US
NZ
Thai
Phil
ROK
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
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Ford‘s interoperability method is then easily applied to determine the level of 
interoperability between the coalition nations during the INTERFET exercise: 
Table 7.  INTERFET Interoperability Measurement (Ford, 2008) 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
AUS US NZ Thai Phil ROK
AUS
US
M NZ
Thai
Phil
ROK
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This method can be applied to any interoperability maturity model to determine how well 
a nation or system interoperates with another. 
Space Acquisition Failures and Lessons Learned 
The Department of Defense‘s space acquisition community has suffered through 
numerous failures as documented by the press, and perhaps more extensively, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO).  It is important to briefly define what is meant 
by a failed acquisition program.  As defined by Merriam-Webster, failure is an ―omission 
of occurrence or performance; specifically, a failing to perform a duty or expected 
action.‖  In space acquisition terms, a failure can be considered a failing to meet cost, 
schedule or performance objectives as originally defined by the program at its inception. 
A thorough review of past space acquisition failures was conducted.  The majority 
of inputs were authored by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), who has an 
extensive history of evaluating space acquisition performance.  The GAO reports were 
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frequently corroborated by independent reviews and other sources, and revealed shared 
reasons for space acquisition failures.  Perhaps the best overall summary was provided by 
a Defense Science Board report produced in 2003.  The group was chaired by Mr. Tom 
Young, a former Martin Marietta Chief Executive, and included membership from many 
space acquisition stalwarts. 
The report, simply titled ―Acquisition of National Security Space Programs‖, and 
despite its 2003 publication date, ―discerned profound insights into systemic problems in 
space acquisition‖ (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, 2003) that still resonate within the space acquisition program offices of 
today.  The report highlighted five deep-seated shortcomings responsible for many of the 
space acquisition failures of the past. 
First, “cost has replaced mission success as the primary driver in managing 
space development programs.”  The report emphasizes the fragility of space acquisition 
programs, citing how ―thousands of good decisions can be undone by a single 
engineering flaw or workmanship error, and these flaws and errors can result in 
catastrophe‖ (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, 2003).  In basic terms, trading schedule and cost savings at the expense of 
mission success is a flawed approach.  For space acquisitions programs, approximately 
70% of the life cycle cost occurs before the system is fielded: 
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Figure 3.  Space Life Cycle Cost Curve (Hamel, 2007) 
There is great pressure to maintain cost and schedule during this phase, but doing so at an 
increased level of mission risk ultimately results in the opposite effect.  The following 
figure characterizes a typical situation; a program manager chooses to save budget and 
schedule by using mission success as margin.  The ultimate effect is an increased risk of 
mission failure, which leads to greater cost increases and schedule delays in the future. 
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Figure 4.  Space Acquisition Scenario (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003) 
Second, “unrealistic estimates lead to unrealistic budgets and unexecutable 
programs.”  This root cause stems primarily from optimistic cost estimates provided by 
an incoming competitor and inadequate cost margin.  The report states that ―analysis of 
recent space competitions found that the incumbent contractor loses more than 90 percent 
of the time.‖  The incumbent contractor is ―burdened‖ by its very relevant and real-world 
legacy program experience, and will produce more realistic cost estimates for a follow-on 
program.  The incumbent is held at a disadvantage however, to a new, less experienced 
contractor who may produce optimistic cost estimates to gain an edge in the competition.  
If the less experienced contractor wins the new contract, the program office budget is 
matched to the unrealistic estimate, almost guaranteeing future program delays and 
increased risk to mission success.  The report also cites an unhealthy emphasis on 
 
26 
program advocacy at the expense of realism as a major contributor to unrealistic 
estimates. 
Third, “undisciplined definition and uncontrolled growth in system requirements 
increase cost and schedule delays.”  The inherent complexity of space systems and the 
ever increasing numbers of users have driven program requirements and Key 
Performance Parameters (KPP) to unmanageable proportions.  The report adds, ―clear 
tradeoffs among cost, schedule, risk, and requirements are not well supported by rigorous 
system engineering, budget, and management processes.‖  Programs with increased 
numbers of users and KPPs are more likely to suffer cost and schedule delays. 
Fourth, “government capabilities to lead and manage the space acquisition 
process have seriously eroded.”  Inexperienced program managers tend to adopt a ―can-
do‖ attitude in place of programmatic rigor.  Additionally, the report states: 
Policies and practices inherent in acquisition reform inordinately devalued the 
systems acquisition engineering workforce. As a result, today‘s government 
systems engineering capabilities are not adequate to support the assessment of 
requirements, conduct trade studies, develop architectures, define programs, 
oversee contractor engineering, and assess risk. With growing emphasis on 
effects-based capabilities and cross-system integration, systems engineering 
becomes even more important and interim corrective action must be considered. 
 
A less experienced acquisition workforce results in an inability to manage programs, and 
very clearly results in program failures. 
Fifth and finally, “industry has failed to implement proven practices on some 
programs.”  The report credits industry‘s knowledge of and ability to utilize proven 
practices, but gently censures them for a lack of focus and dedication to the same. 
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The GAO‘s 2003 report, ―Military Space Operations:  Common Problems and 
their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions,‖ provides a similarly useful summary 
of space acquisition failures over the last two decades.  It cites four primary root causes 
of space acquisition failures, and corroborates many of the findings from the 2003 
Defense Science Board report. 
First, “requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it must 
perform were not adequately defined at the beginning of a program or were changed 
significantly once the program had already begun” (Government Accountability Office, 
2003).  The GAO asserts that this issue caused programs difficulty in matching 
requirements to their resources, and resulted in cost and schedule increases.  This finding 
matches the third Defense Science Board finding listed above. 
Second, “investment practices were weak.  For example, potentially more cost-
effective approaches were not examined and cost estimates were optimistic” 
(Government Accountability Office, 2003).  The GAO specifically cites the lack of an 
overall investment strategy for DOD space as the root cause, where shifts in budget were 
unexpected, and money was often moved from healthier programs to pay for weaker 
ones.  This finding corroborates the second Defense Science Board finding above. 
Third, “acquisition strategies were poorly executed.  For example, competition 
was reduced for the sake of schedule or DOD did not adequately oversee contractors” 
(Government Accountability Office, 2003).  The GAO adds that the DOD took a 
―schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven approach to the acquisition process‖ which 
strongly supports the first Defense Science Board finding listed previously. 
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Fourth, and finally, “technologies were not mature enough to be included in 
product development” (Government Accountability Office, 2003).  Although not 
specifically stated, this cause is tied to the Defense Science Board‘s fourth finding above.  
It can be inferred that a lack of program management and systems engineering rigor 
allowed immature technologies to be used, ultimately resulting in increased program risk. 
In 2006, a Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) panel was 
commissioned by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to evaluate the overall defense 
acquisition enterprise.  The panel‘s major findings place significant emphasis on the 
ability of acquisition‘s major elements to interoperate effectively: 
The evidence we discovered was persistent in recognizing that an effective 
Acquisition System requires stability and continuity that only can be provided 
through successful integration of the major elements upon which it depends. 
When we began this task, we presumed the Department‘s Acquisition System to 
be an efficient integration of the acquisition, requirements and budget processes. 
However, in the course of our review we found that the System is a highly 
complex mechanism that is fragmented in its operation.  (Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment Project, 2006) 
 
The report breaks defense acquisition into six major elements; organization, workforce, 
budget, requirements, acquisition [process], and industry, and provides an assessment of 
each element.  Although not specific to space acquisition, the DAPA review generally 
upholds the findings from the 2003 Defense Science Board report. 
The panel found that “the current decision making process is flawed” in the 
organization element introducing uncertainty and instability in program execution.  The 
panel cites several root causes including disconnects between the acquisition, budget and 
requirements processes.  This finding is captured at a high-level, and can be attributed to 
many of the findings from the 2003 Defense Science Board‘s report. 
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For the workforce element, the panel noted that “a successful program requires a 
professional workforce with subject matter expertise.”  The panel alludes to poor 
integration of budget and requirements personnel into the acquisition workforce, as well 
as a significant lack of experience and training as primary workforce problem areas.  This 
corresponds to the fourth Defense Science Board finding above.  The panel also states: 
Experience and expertise in all functional areas has been de-valued and 
contributes to a ―Conspiracy of Hope‖ in which we understate cost, risk and 
technical readiness and, as a result, embark on programs that are not executable 
within initial estimates.  (Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project, 
2006) 
 
The ―Conspiracy of Hope‖ strongly supports the first and second Defense Science Board 
findings listed previously. 
For the budget element, the panel emphasizes that, “successful Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation and Procurement programs require stable budgets 
and accurate planning” and that this stability simply does not exist.  The panel also 
determined that budget shortfalls were often met by ―stretching programs‖ whereby the 
DOD ―accepts long-term cost increases and delays in acquisition programs to achieve 
short-term savings and budget flexibility.‖  These findings directly support the Defense 
Science Board‘s first finding above.  The panel also cites a problematic use of optimistic 
budget estimates on acquisition programs, further supporting the Defense Science 
Board‘s second finding. 
The panel continues by listing a “lengthy and insufficiently advised requirement 
development process” often based upon “immature technologies and overly optimistic 
estimates of future resource needs and availability” as well as requirements instability as 
 
30 
major problem areas in the requirements element.  These findings validate the second and 
third findings from the Defense Science Board report. 
The acquisition element, when viewed from a process perspective, is 
characterized by the panel as being part of the ―Conspiracy of Hope‖ where “industry is 
encouraged to propose unrealistic cost, optimistic performance and understate technical 
risk estimates during the acquisition solicitation process and the Department is 
encouraged to accept these proposals as the foundation for program baselines,” 
reinforcing the Defense Science Board‘s second finding. 
The panel found that the final element, industry, is extremely fragile, where 
“consolidation of the industrial base, caused by unstable defense demand, has reduced 
the benefits of competition, introduced industrial organizational conflict of interest 
issues, and made every defense contract a “must win” situation for the prime 
contractors.”  This description does not directly relate to a specific Defense Science 
Board finding, but can be cited as a contributing factor. 
To summarize, the DAPA findings provide a more recent overview of acquisition 
lessons learned that validate the earlier Defense Science Board findings from 2003. 
Leading Indicators 
The ―Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Guide‖ serves as the primary 
reference for leading indicators in this thesis.  It states that ―a leading indicator is a 
measure for evaluating the effectiveness of how a specific activity is applied on a project 
in a manner that provides information about impacts that are likely to affect the system 
performance objectives‖ and is useful to ―support the effective management of systems 
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engineering by providing visibility into expected project performance and potential future 
states‖ (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010)1.  Leading 
indicators often use historical data and trends to provide this predictive measure of 
performance and are ―composed of characteristics, a condition and a predicted behavior‖: 
 
Figure 5.  Depiction of a Leading Indicator (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) 
The characteristics are the data, the condition supplies the context in which to evaluate 
the data, and when combined, they provide an indication or predicted behavior.  The 
strength scale captures the relative importance of the indicator based upon past 
experience. 
The guide recommends that leading indicators supplement a program‘s existing 
set of measures, and urges them to properly set planned targets and thresholds using 
                                                 
1 General Use: Permission to reproduce, use this document or parts thereof, and to prepare derivative 
works from this document is granted, with attribution to LAI, INCOSE, PSM, and SEAri, and the original 
author(s), provided this copyright notice is included with all reproductions and derivative works. 
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empirical data.  If data is not available, expert opinion may be used to set targets.  The 
preferred method however is to utilize ―a good historical base of information‖ where 
―organizations…build the collection of the historical measurement data into…collection 
practices‖ (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010). 
These targets are based upon the phases of the acquisition cycle as defined by 
DOD Instruction 5000.02, and help programs understand readiness with respect to 
program milestones.  The applicability of the indicator also varies with program phase.  
As illustrated by the following figure, the indicator ―Requirements Trends‖ provides 
insight in all acquisition phases, while ―System Definition Change Backlog Trend‖ is 
only applicable to three of the five phases. 
Table 8.  Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Overview (truncated) 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) 
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The guide provides 18 major leading indicators with example graphs and detailed 
specifications for use on acquisition programs.  The ―Requirement Trends‖ display below 
demonstrates how a leading indicator might be used on an acquisition program: 
 
Figure 6.  Requirements Trends Example (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) 
In this example, the leading indicator shows a problem with requirements growth 
which drives the program to take action in April.  Later that summer, the program was 
able to evaluate the effectiveness of their actions as the growth in requirements was 
stemmed.  The ―Requirements Trends‖ leading indicator can be directly attributed to the 
2003 Defense Science Board‘s finding ―undisciplined definition and uncontrolled growth 
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in system requirements increase cost and schedule delays” (Office of the Undersecretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003), and provides a way to 
measure how well a program is or is not protecting itself from the causes of the 
acquisition failures of the past. 
It is important to recognize that lessons learned represent a source of historical 
empirical data that can be used to develop a leading indicator.  In this case, the Defense 
Science Board, GAO and DAPA reports provide the characteristics and conditions in 
which to formulate and evaluate a leading indicator of space acquisition program success. 
Summary 
The 2003 Defense Science Board and GAO reports provide a concise and 
comprehensive review of the space acquisition failures of the past.  Each report supports 
the other‘s findings, and presents a strong case identifying the primary space acquisition 
characteristics that drive success or failure.  These characteristics can serve as attributes 
or characters for the basis of an interoperability measurement and a leading indicator of 
program performance. 
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III.  Methodology 
Furthermore, if systems implement a confrontational operational process and are identified 
and modeled in the context of a measure of operational effectiveness tied to that process, then 
another fundamental result mathematically relates the change in interoperability of the 
systems with a change in the measure of operational effectiveness. 
 
—Thomas C. Ford (Ford, 2008) 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a method to measure acquisition 
interoperability using key, driving acquisition characters derived from past acquisition 
experience.  This method will use Ford‘s inaugural work on confrontational 
interoperability measurement to create a new collaborative, acquisition interoperability 
measurement, and will be applied to several space acquisition programs for 
demonstration in the ―Analysis and Results‖ chapter.  These scenarios will also 
emphasize the utility of the new method for assessing the effectiveness of acquisition 
processes that must interact to accomplish a specific goal. 
Space Acquisition Interoperability 
Within an acquisition program, there is little doubt that cost, schedule and 
requirements are intrinsically linked.  The numerical values of cost in dollars, schedule in 
years, and requirements in number of KPPs can be approximated using basic 
mathematical relationships, e.g. more KPPs will result in an increase in cost and 
schedule.  Acquisition systems on the other hand drive the ability of a program to manage 
and control these values.  The people, processes and products that determine a program‘s 
cost, schedule and requirements can be described as systems.  The following figure from 
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the Defense Science Board report supplies a depiction of the major space acquisition 
systems found on a typical space program (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003): 
 
Figure 7.  Space Acquisition Systems (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003) 
Note:  In this case, the term “margin” is not a system in and of itself.  It is better described as a 
program characteristic.  Additionally, the report included the term “launch” to illustrate specific 
launch constraints placed upon a program, e.g. the satellite’s size and weight.  Although launch is 
an important aspect of any program, it was not explicitly cited as a prime cause of space 
acquisition failures and was omitted as a result.   
 
These acquisition systems must work together to create a program that is executable in 
order to deliver mission performance on time and budget.  More specifically, the cost, 
schedule and requirements systems must provide and accept services from one another in 
order to operate effectively.  Therefore, using Ford‘s nomenclature, the space acquisition 
systems are captured as:  S = {cost, schedule, requirements}.  Each system represents the 
people, processes and products that determine and control the cost, schedule and 
requirements for a given program. 
 
37 
 The interoperations that occur between these space acquisitions systems are 
profuse and complex.  Using the lessons learned from past space acquisition failures, the 
quintessential interoperations can be extracted and applied to a maturity model.  In order 
to compose the model, the individual interoperations between systems must be examined. 
Requirements-to-Schedule Interoperability 
The requirements-to-schedule interoperation is most simply described in terms of 
requirements stability, scope and complexity.  As the 2003 Defense Science Board report 
states, more Key Performance Parameters (KPP) as well as ―undisciplined definition and 
uncontrolled growth‖ in requirements will result in increased schedule (Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003).  More 
complex requirements may drive a program to pursue less mature technologies, which 
will also result in increased schedule.  The schedule system cannot effectively operate if 
the requirements system is unstable or attempts to take major leaps in capability. 
Schedule-to-Requirements Interoperability 
This interoperation is focused on the program‘s intent and priority when 
performing trades or utilizing margin.  A program‘s requirements become less executable 
when schedule is traded at the expense of mission assurance.  Therefore, this relationship 
is defined by the way the systems utilize shared margin, and how that use impacts the 
program‘s overall executability.  If the schedule system dominates trade decisions, the 
requirements system will be compromised. 
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Requirements-to-Cost Interoperability 
The requirements-to-cost interoperation is analogous to the requirements-to-
schedule interoperation.  More KPPs drive program complexity and decrease the ability 
of the cost system to accurately predict and control program costs.  Again, the 
requirements drive the selection of technology.  That is, a demand for cutting edge 
performance will likely drive a state-of-the-art technology choice, which decreases cost 
confidence.  Additionally, the requirements influence the level of experience that exists 
within industry.  If the requirements system chooses to baseline a program that has no 
legacy or comparable system, then the availability of experience will shrink, ultimately 
decreasing cost confidence. 
Cost-to-Requirements Interoperability 
Unrealistic cost estimates have been a mainstay of space acquisition criticism and 
are the driving factor in this interoperation.  More realistic cost estimates will deliver a 
program that is more executable.  The ability of the cost system to justify and secure the 
appropriate funding will also influence the requirements system‘s ability to achieve the 
intended performance. 
Schedule-to-Cost Interoperability 
The schedule-to-cost interoperation again deals with realistic estimates and how 
margin is utilized by the acquisition systems.  In this case, a poor schedule estimate or 
overly aggressive plan will result in a poor cost estimate.  When schedule is traded at the 
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expense of mission assurance, the cost system will suffer because it is forced to accept 
more risk. 
Cost-to-Schedule Interoperability 
This interoperation is simply the reverse of the schedule-to-cost interoperation.  
Therefore the schedule-to-cost or cost-to-schedule relationship is considered to be bi-
directional. 
Space Acquisition Interoperability Characters 
The National Security Space Acquisition Policy Interim Guidance provides a 
good starting point for character development.  Paragraph 4, titled ―DOD SPACE MDA 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES‖ states, ―Over the first fifty years of the history of space 
acquisition, several enduring principles have emerged.  The following principles should 
be considered by all NSS members to set the tone and guide decision making in the 
acquisition of NSS systems‖ (Department of Defense, 2009).  When merged with the key 
system interoperations based upon past acquisition failures, the vital interoperability 
characteristics that must be present and mature to enable mission success are revealed.  
As captured in the interim guidance, the principles of ―mission success‖, ―stable‖, 
―disciplined‖ and ―cost realism‖ best match the findings from the 2003 Defense Science 
Board report: 
Mission Success:  The overarching principle behind all National Security Space 
programs is mission success.  When acquiring space systems, mission success 
must be the first consideration when assessing the risks and trades among cost, 
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schedule, and performance.  Risk management, test planning, system engineering, 
and funding profiles must be driven by this objective. 
Stable:  Within a given acquisition increment, stable budgets, stable 
requirements, stable direction, and low personnel turnover are necessary for 
successful program acquisition.  Decisions made by the acquisition execution 
chain must be durable. 
Disciplined:  All parties to this space acquisition policy must exercise the 
discipline necessary to achieve its goals without allowing its procedures to 
become unnecessarily burdensome and/or time consuming. 
Cost Realism:  The goal is to develop and grow a world-class national security 
space cost estimating capability.  Cost estimates must be independent and 
accomplished in a timely, realistic, and complete manner.  Cost will be controlled 
by estimating accurately and focusing on quality to reduce rework and achieve 
mission success.  All members of the NSS acquisition execution chain must insist 
on, and protect, a realistic management reserve. 
These NSS principles are then tailored for the purpose of measuring acquisition 
interoperability based upon the cardinal lessons learned.  The following four acquisition 
interoperability characters and definitions are produced: 
Mission Focus:  When acquiring space systems, mission success must be the first 
consideration when assessing the risks and trades among cost, schedule, and 
performance.  Risk management, test planning, system engineering, and funding 
profiles must be driven by this objective. 
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Stability:  Within a given acquisition increment, stable budgets, stable 
requirements, stable direction, and low personnel turnover are necessary for 
successful program acquisition.  Decisions made by the acquisition execution 
chain must be durable.  Technology is sufficiently mature and stable. 
Discipline:  The program must exercise the discipline necessary to achieve its 
goals using an experienced acquisition team adhering to proven programmatic and 
system engineering processes. 
Realism:  Program estimates must be independently verified and accomplished in 
a timely, realistic, and complete manner.  Technology, schedule and cost will be 
controlled by estimating accurately and focusing on quality to reduce rework and 
achieve mission success.  All members of the NSS acquisition execution chain 
must insist on, and protect, a realistic management reserve. 
These four characters, X = {mission focus, stability, discipline, realism}, capture the chief 
causes of space acquisition failures as described above at a high level.  It is recognized 
that lower levels of detail will discover additional, more specific characters that could 
lend themselves to a more detailed measure of acquisition interoperability.  As Ford 
noted with OIM, ―Although the final version of the OIM model remained limited to a 4-
attribute, 5-level model, at least 35 sub-attributes were further defined‖ however, ―by not 
addressing them as individual attributes, fidelity is lost from the model, and their contribution 
is effectively averaged out‖ (Ford, 2008).  Therefore it is important to only select the key and 
driving characters as evidenced by past experience to avoid watering down the results with 
less relevant characters. 
 
42 
Incorporating Interoperability Lessons Learned Into a Maturity Model 
The 2003 GAO and Defense Science Board reports on the space acquisition 
enterprise provide the foundation for development of a space acquisitions maturity model 
based upon the systems and characters described above.  The levels of the maturity model 
can be built by examining the recommended solutions from the 2003 Defense Science 
Board report (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, 2003) discussed earlier. 
Maturity Model Levels 
As illustrated earlier, the LISI and OIM models utilized a five-level scale to 
define and measure the maturity of a system in a specific character.  The acquisition 
model will follow a similar five-level construct and is guided by the definitions provided 
by OIM.  Using Ford‘s nomenclature, the maturity levels represent character states; that 
is, C = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. 
Level 0 – Separated:  The system operates independently of others.  The 
system‘s goals are not congruent with others, and little evidence exists to guide decision-
making.  The people, processes and products of the system are inexperienced and 
unproven. 
Level 1 – Aligned:  The system recognizes the impact it has on others and 
considers space acquisition best practices and lessons learned when making decisions, but 
continues to value its own goals over others.  The people, processes and products possess 
experience in the domain, but remain unproven for the task at hand. 
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Level 2 – Structured:  The system is aware of the impact it has on others and 
utilizes space acquisition best practices and lessons learned when making decisions.  The 
system‘s decisions are made with a shared goal in mind.  The people, processes and 
products have experience executing a similar task. 
Level 3 – Associated:  The system understands its impact on others and has 
incorporated space acquisitions best practices and lessons learned into its overall 
baseline, as well as its decision making process.  Decisions are made in a structured 
environment with other systems using shared goals.  The system will forgo its own 
interests for the betterment of the whole.  The people, processes and products have 
executed similar tasks on many occasions. 
Level 4 – Accordant:  The system‘s decision-making process is integrated with 
others.  Space acquisition best practices and lessons learned are unified across all systems 
and guide decision making.  Knowledge is shared and understood across systems.  The 
system does not maintain its own interests; all efforts are integrated toward a shared goal.  
The people, processes and products have successfully executed nearly identical tasks on 
many occasions. 
The Space Acquisition Interoperability Maturity Model (SAIMM) 
The SAIMM fuses the space acquisition interoperability characters and maturity 
levels into a format that readily facilitates an acquisition interoperability measurement 
based upon space acquisition history.  The character states capture the key and driving 
aspects of each character, and reflect the significant drivers of the cost, schedule and 
requirements systems‘ interoperation success. 
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Table 9.  SAIMM 
 
Note:  The stability character also captures the legal requirement contained in Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 2366b that “the 
technology in the program has been demonstrated in a relevant environment [commonly accepted as technology readiness level (TRL) 6], as 
determined by the Milestone Decision Authority on the basis of an independent review and assessment by the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering” 
MISSION FOCUS STABILITY DISCIPLINE REALISM
Level 4 - 
Accordant
Mission success is weighted 
significantly higher than cost and 
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk 
management, test planning, system 
engineering, and funding profiles
Stable budgets, stable requirements, 
stable direction, and low personnel 
turnover are maintained across the 
board; program decisions are constant; 
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a prime contractor) and 
maintains strict adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified and accomplished in a timely, 
realistic, and complete manner; 
minimal rework is required; program 
funding and management reserve is 
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with 
25% management reserve) 
Level 3 - 
Associated
Mission success is weighted higher 
than cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover rarely change and 
remain stable in critical areas; program 
decisions rarely change; technology is 
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a major subcontractor) and 
maintains adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified; rework is rarely required; 
program funding is unrealistic 
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost 
confidence) with realistic management 
reserve (20% or greater)
Level 2 - 
Structured
Mission success is weighted equally to 
cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change occasionally 
in a few minor areas; program decisions 
change occasionally; technology 
requires maturation (TRL 5)
The acquisition team has some 
experience (previous experience on a 
similar program as a subcontractor) and 
utilizes proven processes in most areas
Program estimates are independently 
verified but unrealistic in a few minor 
areas; rework is occasionally required; 
program funding is unrealistic (50/50 
cost confidence) with realistic 
management reserve (20% or greater)
Level 1 - 
Aligned
Cost and schedule are weighted higher 
than mission success
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change frequently 
in several critical areas; program 
decisions change frequently; 
technology requires significant 
maturation (TRL 4)
The acquisition team has limited 
experience (previous experience on a 
portion of a similar program) and has 
knowledge of proven processes but 
does not use them consistently
Program estimates are unrealistic in 
several critical areas; rework is 
frequently required; program funding 
is unrealistic with inadequate (less 
than 20%) management reserve
Level 0 - 
Separated
Cost and schedule are weighted 
significantly higher than mission 
success
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover continually change 
in many critical areas; program 
decisions continually change; 
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
The acquisition team has no experience 
(first-ever program) and does not have 
access to proven processes (they do not 
exist)
Program estimates are unrealistic and 
focused on program advocacy; rework 
is continually required; program 
funding is unrealistic with little or no 
management reserve
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Summary 
The SAIMM may be used to characterize the interoperability maturity of any 
space acquisition program by providing a framework informed by the acquisition failures 
of the past.
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Recent operations have once again illustrated the degree to which U.S. national security 
depends on space capabilities. We believe this dependence will continue to grow, and as 
it does, the systemic problems we identify in our report will become only more pressing 
and severe. 
 
— Mr. A. Thomas Young (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, 2003) 
Chapter Overview 
Using the OIM construct and INTERFET exercise, Ford‘s interoperability 
measurement provided insight into coalition nation interoperability.  The SAIMM 
construct delivers a mechanism to do the equivalent for the space acquisition world.  
Space acquisition systems, S = {cost, schedule, requirements}, can be characterized using 
the characters, X = {mission focus, stability, discipline, realism}, and character states, X 
= {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, from SAIMM, which facilitates an interoperability measurement using 
Ford‘s method.  In this chapter, several space acquisition programs will be evaluated for 
their acquisition systems‘ interoperability using SAIMM.  A review of each evaluation 
will be used to explain the utility of the acquisition interoperability measurement. 
It is important to note that some subjectivity was required when evaluating the 
programs in the following examples using SAIMM.  Each SAIMM level includes 
multiple factors for evaluating a program‘s maturity.  For example, the SAIMM Level 3 
in the stability character requires that ―budgets, requirements, direction and personnel 
turnover rarely change and remain stable in critical areas; program decisions rarely 
change; technology is sufficiently mature.‖  A program could have mature technology but 
suffer from requirements that frequently changed.  The resulting SAIMM score in this 
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character could fall somewhere between 1 and 3.  In this and the following examples, the 
worst case score was generally chosen.  Scoring was further influenced by the historical 
result and impact that the action or condition had on the program.  
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System 
The AEHF system, the replacement for the aging MILSTAR constellation of 
communications satellites, recently launched the first of four satellites into orbit.  The 
prime contractor for the system is Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company (Sunnyvale 
California) and the payload provider is Northrup Grumman Aerospace Systems (Redondo 
Beach California).  Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company was also the prime 
contractor on the legacy MILSTAR system. 
AEHF was challenged by multiple launch slips and a Nunn-McCurdy breach in 
September 2008.  At program inception, five satellites were to be delivered at an 
estimated cost of $5.4 billion.  In 2003 the program scope had diminished to three 
satellites, but the total program cost remained at $4.8 billion (Government Accountability 
Office, 2003).  This represents a growth in average per satellite cost by $570 million.  
The GAO cites several factors in the requirements, schedule and cost systems that led to 
AEHF‘s inability to meet its goals.  The Department of Defense frequently altered 
requirements, pursued an overly aggressive, unrealistic schedule, and did not have the 
required funding to support the activities and manpower to design and build the satellites 
faster (Government Accountability Office, 2003). 
Based on this evidence, it is clear that the major failures were primarily caused by 
poor interoperability in the stability and realism characters.  Frequent requirement and 
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design changes resulted in cost growth and schedule delays.  Although the program 
utilized an experienced (incumbent) contractor with strong technical maturity, they 
pursued an incredibly aggressive schedule with inadequate funding.  This unrealistic 
schedule and cost effectively severely compromised the overall system‘s ability to 
accomplish the requirements.  The program‘s mission focus was also skewed in favor of 
schedule and cost.  Therefore, the AEHF SAIMM is scored as follows: 
Table 10.  AEHF SAIMM, 2003 
 
This SAIMM score results in the following instantiation of AEHF: 
MISSION FOCUS STABILITY DISCIPLINE REALISM
Level 4 - 
Accordant
Mission success is weighted 
significantly higher than cost and 
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk 
management, test planning, system 
engineering, and funding profiles
Stable budgets, stable requirements, 
stable direction, and low personnel 
turnover are maintained across the 
board; program decisions are constant; 
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a prime contractor) and 
maintains strict adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified and accomplished in a timely, 
realistic, and complete manner; 
minimal rework is required; program 
funding and management reserve is 
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with 
25% management reserve) 
Level 3 - 
Associated
Mission success is weighted higher 
than cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover rarely change and 
remain stable in critical areas; program 
decisions rarely change; technology is 
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a major subcontractor) and 
maintains adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified; rework is rarely required; 
program funding is unrealistic 
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost 
confidence) with realistic management 
reserve (20% or greater)
Level 2 - 
Structured
Mission success is weighted equally to 
cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change occasionally 
in a few minor areas; program decisions 
change occasionally; technology 
requires maturation (TRL 5)
The acquisition team has some 
experience (previous experience on a 
similar program as a subcontractor) and 
utilizes proven processes in most areas
Program estimates are independently 
verified but unrealistic in a few minor 
areas; rework is occasionally required; 
program funding is unrealistic (50/50 
cost confidence) with realistic 
management reserve (20% or greater)
Level 1 - 
Aligned
Cost and schedule are weighted higher 
than mission success
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change frequently 
in several critical areas; program 
decisions change frequently; 
technology requires significant 
maturation (TRL 4)
The acquisition team has limited 
experience (previous experience on a 
portion of a similar program) and has 
knowledge of proven processes but 
does not use them consistently
Program estimates are unrealistic in 
several critical areas; rework is 
frequently required; program funding 
is unrealistic with inadequate (less 
than 20%) management reserve
Level 0 - 
Separated
Cost and schedule are weighted 
significantly higher than mission 
success
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover continually change 
in many critical areas; program 
decisions continually change; 
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
The acquisition team has no experience 
(first-ever program) and does not have 
access to proven processes (they do not 
exist)
Program estimates are unrealistic and 
focused on program advocacy; rework 
is continually required; program 
funding is unrealistic with little or no 
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS
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Table 11.  AEHF Instantiation, 2003 
 
Recall that cmax represents the range of possible character states, n signifies the number of 
characters used to instantiate the systems, and r is ordinarily set to 2.  Using Ford‘s 
Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no self-interoperability, 
the interoperability measurement yields: 
Table 12.  AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2003 
 
The AEHF program was again, albeit briefly reviewed by the GAO roughly five 
months before the program‘s first launch in August of 2010.  The report provided several 
morsels of new evidence that can be used to update the program‘s interoperability 
measurement from 2003.  The program made significant progress since the 2003 GAO 
report, but it came at the expense of hundreds of millions of dollars in cost growth and 
multiple launch slips representing approximately four years of delay.  The program 
achieved strong stability and discipline in the requirements system, and maintained solid 
maturity across the remaining systems and characters.  The SAIMM for AEHF at this 
point is as follows: 
AEHF (2003) Mission Focus Stability Discipline Realism
Cost 0 2 1 0
Schedule 0 2 1 1
Requirements 1 0 4 3
AEHF (2003) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.191 0.138
Schedule 0.191 0.000 0.176
Requirements 0.138 0.176 0.000
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Table 13.  AEHF SAIMM, 2010 
 
Which results in the following interoperability instantiation: 
Table 14.  AEHF Instantiation, 2010 
 
Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no self-
interoperability, the interoperability measurement yields: 
MISSION FOCUS STABILITY DISCIPLINE REALISM
Level 4 - 
Accordant
Mission success is weighted 
significantly higher than cost and 
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk 
management, test planning, system 
engineering, and funding profiles
Stable budgets, stable requirements, 
stable direction, and low personnel 
turnover are maintained across the 
board; program decisions are constant; 
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a prime contractor) and 
maintains strict adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified and accomplished in a timely, 
realistic, and complete manner; 
minimal rework is required; program 
funding and management reserve is 
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with 
25% management reserve) 
Level 3 - 
Associated
Mission success is weighted higher 
than cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover rarely change and 
remain stable in critical areas; program 
decisions rarely change; technology is 
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a major subcontractor) and 
maintains adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified; rework is rarely required; 
program funding is unrealistic 
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost 
confidence) with realistic management 
reserve (20% or greater)
Level 2 - 
Structured
Mission success is weighted equally to 
cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change occasionally 
in a few minor areas; program decisions 
change occasionally; technology 
requires maturation (TRL 5)
The acquisition team has some 
experience (previous experience on a 
similar program as a subcontractor) and 
utilizes proven processes in most areas
Program estimates are independently 
verified but unrealistic in a few minor 
areas; rework is occasionally required; 
program funding is unrealistic (50/50 
cost confidence) with realistic 
management reserve (20% or greater)
Level 1 - 
Aligned
Cost and schedule are weighted higher 
than mission success
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change frequently 
in several critical areas; program 
decisions change frequently; 
technology requires significant 
maturation (TRL 4)
The acquisition team has limited 
experience (previous experience on a 
portion of a similar program) and has 
knowledge of proven processes but 
does not use them consistently
Program estimates are unrealistic in 
several critical areas; rework is 
frequently required; program funding 
is unrealistic with inadequate (less 
than 20%) management reserve
Level 0 - 
Separated
Cost and schedule are weighted 
significantly higher than mission 
success
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover continually change 
in many critical areas; program 
decisions continually change; 
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
The acquisition team has no experience 
(first-ever program) and does not have 
access to proven processes (they do not 
exist)
Program estimates are unrealistic and 
focused on program advocacy; rework 
is continually required; program 
funding is unrealistic with little or no 
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS
COST, SCHEDULE & REQUIREMENTS
AEHF (2010) Mission Focus Stability Discipline Realism
Cost 3 3 3 3
Schedule 3 3 3 3
Requirements 3 4 4 3
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Table 15.  AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2010 
 
National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (NPOESS) 
NPOESS was a tri-agency program (Department of Commerce, National Air and 
Space Administration, and the Department of Defense) that suffered through numerous 
setbacks.  Originally scheduled to launch in 2006, the program was restructured in 2007 
due to a Nunn-McCurdy breach, and its first satellite, known as the NPOESS Prepatory 
Project, is now scheduled to launch in late 2011 (Government Accountability Office, 
2010).  Earlier this year the program was cancelled and split into separate Department of 
Commerce and Department of Defense programs.  The prime contractor for NPOESS 
was Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems (Los Angeles, California) who also had 
significant experience building the DOD‘s legacy weather satellite, the Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program. 
In 2009, an independent review team was commissioned by the NPOESS 
Executive Committee to review the program‘s management approach and to determine 
key issues and risks.  The review team was chaired by Mr. Tom Young, who was also the 
chair of the 2003 Defense Science Board review team, and based on their findings 
(NPOESS Independent Review Team, 2009), the NPOESS program demonstrated 
significant issues across all of the major acquisition systems as manifested heavily in the 
mission focus and stability characters.  Cost and schedule took priority over mission 
AEHF (2010) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.750 0.669
Schedule 0.750 0.000 0.669
Requirements 0.669 0.669 0.000
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success, budgets were inadequate, the management team lacked experience, and the 
program‘s requirements were in conflict due to the tri-agency management structure.  
The resulting SAIMM score: 
Table 16.  NPOESS SAIMM, 2009 
 
Which yields the following NPOESS instantiation: 
Table 17.  NPOESS Instantiation, 2009 
 
Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no self-
interoperability, the interoperability measurement yields: 
MISSION FOCUS STABILITY DISCIPLINE REALISM
Level 4 - 
Accordant
Mission success is weighted 
significantly higher than cost and 
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk 
management, test planning, system 
engineering, and funding profiles
Stable budgets, stable requirements, 
stable direction, and low personnel 
turnover are maintained across the 
board; program decisions are constant; 
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a prime contractor) and 
maintains strict adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified and accomplished in a timely, 
realistic, and complete manner; 
minimal rework is required; program 
funding and management reserve is 
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with 
25% management reserve) 
Level 3 - 
Associated
Mission success is weighted higher 
than cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover rarely change and 
remain stable in critical areas; program 
decisions rarely change; technology is 
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a major subcontractor) and 
maintains adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified; rework is rarely required; 
program funding is unrealistic 
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost 
confidence) with realistic management 
reserve (20% or greater)
Level 2 - 
Structured
Mission success is weighted equally to 
cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change occasionally 
in a few minor areas; program decisions 
change occasionally; technology 
requires maturation (TRL 5)
The acquisition team has some 
experience (previous experience on a 
similar program as a subcontractor) and 
utilizes proven processes in most areas
Program estimates are independently 
verified but unrealistic in a few minor 
areas; rework is occasionally required; 
program funding is unrealistic (50/50 
cost confidence) with realistic 
management reserve (20% or greater)
Level 1 - 
Aligned
Cost and schedule are weighted higher 
than mission success
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change frequently 
in several critical areas; program 
decisions change frequently; 
technology requires significant 
maturation (TRL 4)
The acquisition team has limited 
experience (previous experience on a 
portion of a similar program) and has 
knowledge of proven processes but 
does not use them consistently
Program estimates are unrealistic in 
several critical areas; rework is 
frequently required; program funding 
is unrealistic with inadequate (less 
than 20%) management reserve
Level 0 - 
Separated
Cost and schedule are weighted 
significantly higher than mission 
success
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover continually change 
in many critical areas; program 
decisions continually change; 
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
The acquisition team has no experience 
(first-ever program) and does not have 
access to proven processes (they do not 
exist)
Program estimates are unrealistic and 
focused on program advocacy; rework 
is continually required; program 
funding is unrealistic with little or no 
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS
NPOESS Mission Focus Stability Discipline Realism
Cost 0 2 1 2
Schedule 1 2 1 1
Requirements 1 0 2 1
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Table 18.  NPOESS Interoperability Measurement, 2009 
 
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High 
In the early 1990s, the DOD embraced a Total System Performance 
Responsibility (TSPR) approach for system acquisitions.  In theory, TSPR allowed the 
government to leverage existing contractor management and commercial practices with 
minimal oversight by turning government-led functions over to the contractor.  In 1996, 
the SBIRS program was initiated and Lockheed Martin was selected as the prime 
contractor with Northrup Grumman as their major subcontractor.  Northrup Grumman 
was both the prime contractor and sensor developer for the legacy Defense Support 
Program.  Despite this legacy experience, the program generated expansive cost and 
schedule failures.   By the fall of 2001, SBIRS had an estimated cost growth in excess of 
$2 billion (Government Accountability Office, 2003).  After three Nunn-McCurdy 
violations, problems on the SBIRS program have persisted to the present day as 
manifested by a 200% change in total program cost and a unit cost growth of nearly $2.5 
billion (Government Accountability Office, 2010). 
The program instituted several independent reviews while the GAO continued to 
monitor the program‘s progress against cost, schedule and performance goals.  Three 
reports were issued in 2003, 2005 and 2008 that capture various findings from 
independent reviews, the GAO and others.  The causes for the program‘s cost growth, 
NPOESS - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.257 0.188
Schedule 0.257 0.000 0.203
Requirements 0.188 0.203 0.000
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schedule delays and performance issues are often attributed to the TSPR-model, but a 
deeper examination is required to root out the specific causes of a ―troubled program that 
could be considered a case study for how not to execute a space program‖ (Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003). 
The 2003 GAO report was issued after the program restructured in 2002.  The 
GAO determined that significant cost and schedule risk remained despite the 
restructuring.  From an acquisition system interoperability perspective, the SBIRS High 
program had fatal flaws across all of the interoperability characters in each system.  At 
this point in time, the program moved ahead despite numerous best practice violations in 
all characters.  Requirements were not well understood and the overall complexity of the 
program was underestimated.  The management team was unable to deal with this 
untenable situation, which resulted in ―the Program Office and contractor having to spend 
25 of the first 60 months of the contract on replanning activities‖ (Government 
Accountability Office, 2003).  The 2003 Defense Science Board summarized the core 
issue, ―In short, SBIRS High illustrates that while government and industry understand 
how to manage challenging space programs, they abandoned fundamentals and replaced 
them with unproven approaches that promised significant savings. In so doing, they 
accepted unjustified risk‖ (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, 2003).  The following SAIMM results: 
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Table 19.  SBIRS SAIMM, 2003 
 
Which yields the interoperability instantiation of: 
Table 20.  SBIRS Instantiation, 2003 
 
Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no self-
interoperability, the interoperability measurement yields: 
MISSION FOCUS STABILITY DISCIPLINE REALISM
Level 4 - 
Accordant
Mission success is weighted 
significantly higher than cost and 
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk 
management, test planning, system 
engineering, and funding profiles
Stable budgets, stable requirements, 
stable direction, and low personnel 
turnover are maintained across the 
board; program decisions are constant; 
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a prime contractor) and 
maintains strict adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified and accomplished in a timely, 
realistic, and complete manner; 
minimal rework is required; program 
funding and management reserve is 
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with 
25% management reserve) 
Level 3 - 
Associated
Mission success is weighted higher 
than cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover rarely change and 
remain stable in critical areas; program 
decisions rarely change; technology is 
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a major subcontractor) and 
maintains adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified; rework is rarely required; 
program funding is unrealistic 
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost 
confidence) with realistic management 
reserve (20% or greater)
Level 2 - 
Structured
Mission success is weighted equally to 
cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change occasionally 
in a few minor areas; program decisions 
change occasionally; technology 
requires maturation (TRL 5)
The acquisition team has some 
experience (previous experience on a 
similar program as a subcontractor) and 
utilizes proven processes in most areas
Program estimates are independently 
verified but unrealistic in a few minor 
areas; rework is occasionally required; 
program funding is unrealistic (50/50 
cost confidence) with realistic 
management reserve (20% or greater)
Level 1 - 
Aligned
Cost and schedule are weighted higher 
than mission success
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change frequently 
in several critical areas; program 
decisions change frequently; 
technology requires significant 
maturation (TRL 4)
The acquisition team has limited 
experience (previous experience on a 
portion of a similar program) and has 
knowledge of proven processes but 
does not use them consistently
Program estimates are unrealistic in 
several critical areas; rework is 
frequently required; program funding 
is unrealistic with inadequate (less 
than 20%) management reserve
Level 0 - 
Separated
Cost and schedule are weighted 
significantly higher than mission 
success
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover continually change 
in many critical areas; program 
decisions continually change; 
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
The acquisition team has no experience 
(first-ever program) and does not have 
access to proven processes (they do not 
exist)
Program estimates are unrealistic and 
focused on program advocacy; rework 
is continually required; program 
funding is unrealistic with little or no 
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS
SBIRS (2003) Mission Focus Stability Discipline Realism
Cost 1 1 1 0
Schedule 0 1 1 1
Requirements 1 0 0 0
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Table 21.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2003 
 
In 2005, many of the GAO‘s concerns were realized as the program continued to 
experience difficulties.  During this period, the Secretary of Defense was directed by 
Congress to provide a report ―on the cause of the most recent SBIRS cost increases, 
schedule delays, and technical problems; the most recent Defense Support Program gap 
analysis and any effect that further delays will have on U.S. early warning, technical 
intelligence, and missile defense capabilities; steps taken to address the most recent 
SBIRS technical difficulties; any adjustments in management and contract arrangements 
with the contractor to reflect the most recent program challenges; remaining risk areas; 
and an assessment of the confidence level in the SBIRS schedule and cost estimates 
current as of October 1, 2004‖ (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005).  The 
subsequent report cited a lack of ―sound system engineering processes and 
procedures…insufficient schedule and budget…process escapes‖ and ―an inadequate 
architecture design and a flawed flight software development plan‖ (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2005).  The report also cites several program initiatives designed to 
―better focus resources on key program issues,‖ and to ―formally adopt an ‗event-driven‘ 
approach, replacing the ‗schedule-driven‘ mentality of the past…ensures the program no 
longer enters an activity unless the probability for success is high‖ (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2005).  Adjustments to the program‘s business rhythm, testing 
SBIRS (2003) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.154 0.103
Schedule 0.154 0.000 0.094
Requirements 0.103 0.094 0.000
 
57 
activities, and contract were also noted.  These findings do not represent a major 
improvement in the SBIRS program however as the findings from 2003 were either 
realized or persisted.  As such, there is not enough evidence presented in the 2005 report 
to significantly alter the interoperability measurement from 2003. 
Fast forward to 2008; SBIRS has just experienced a major setback with its flight 
software and the GAO once again warns against an ―ambitious,‖ even ―optimistic‖ plan 
to resolve the problems.  The 2008 GAO report found that the issues largely stemmed 
from the program‘s test and evaluation area, however it is more important to examine the 
GAO‘s assessment of the program‘s plan going forward.  With respect to the flight 
software issue, significant interoperability issues remained in the mission focus, discipline 
and realism characters.  Cost and schedule estimates were overly optimistic, and there 
was little to no margin to react to more problems if they occurred.  The program also 
requested waivers to forgo ―disciplined processes,‖ which marginalized mission 
assurance (Government Accountability Office, 2008). 
Just prior to the GAO report, in 2007, another independent review team was 
commissioned to review the program‘s status.  The following chart summarizes the 
program‘s progress against this independent review team‘s findings and 
recommendations: 
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Table 22.  Independent Program Assessment (Government Accountability Office, 
2008) 
 
This table indicates the program has improved interoperability between the cost and 
schedule systems, as well as between the government and contractor team.  Based on the 
2007 independent review team‘s findings and the 2008 GAO report, there is sufficient 
evidence to update the program‘s SAIMM and interoperability measurements. 
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Table 23.  SBIRS SAIMM, 2008 
 
Which yields the following instantiation: 
Table 24.  SBIRS Instantiation, 2008 
 
Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no self-
interoperability, the interoperability measurement yields: 
MISSION FOCUS STABILITY DISCIPLINE REALISM
Level 4 - 
Accordant
Mission success is weighted 
significantly higher than cost and 
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk 
management, test planning, system 
engineering, and funding profiles
Stable budgets, stable requirements, 
stable direction, and low personnel 
turnover are maintained across the 
board; program decisions are constant; 
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a prime contractor) and 
maintains strict adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified and accomplished in a timely, 
realistic, and complete manner; 
minimal rework is required; program 
funding and management reserve is 
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with 
25% management reserve) 
Level 3 - 
Associated
Mission success is weighted higher 
than cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover rarely change and 
remain stable in critical areas; program 
decisions rarely change; technology is 
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a major subcontractor) and 
maintains adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified; rework is rarely required; 
program funding is unrealistic 
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost 
confidence) with realistic management 
reserve (20% or greater)
Level 2 - 
Structured
Mission success is weighted equally to 
cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change occasionally 
in a few minor areas; program decisions 
change occasionally; technology 
requires maturation (TRL 5)
The acquisition team has some 
experience (previous experience on a 
similar program as a subcontractor) and 
utilizes proven processes in most areas
Program estimates are independently 
verified but unrealistic in a few minor 
areas; rework is occasionally required; 
program funding is unrealistic (50/50 
cost confidence) with realistic 
management reserve (20% or greater)
Level 1 - 
Aligned
Cost and schedule are weighted higher 
than mission success
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change frequently 
in several critical areas; program 
decisions change frequently; 
technology requires significant 
maturation (TRL 4)
The acquisition team has limited 
experience (previous experience on a 
portion of a similar program) and has 
knowledge of proven processes but 
does not use them consistently
Program estimates are unrealistic in 
several critical areas; rework is 
frequently required; program funding 
is unrealistic with inadequate (less 
than 20%) management reserve
Level 0 - 
Separated
Cost and schedule are weighted 
significantly higher than mission 
success
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover continually change 
in many critical areas; program 
decisions continually change; 
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
The acquisition team has no experience 
(first-ever program) and does not have 
access to proven processes (they do not 
exist)
Program estimates are unrealistic and 
focused on program advocacy; rework 
is continually required; program 
funding is unrealistic with little or no 
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS
SBIRS (2008) Mission Focus Stability Discipline Realism
Cost 1 2 3 2
Schedule 0 2 3 2
Requirements 1 3 2 1
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Table 25.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2008 
 
The GAO provided a brief assessment of the SBIRS High program again in 2010 
and noted that ―all three critical technologies…are now mature‖ and ―99 percent of 
the…expected design drawings are now releasable,‖ but also cited ―design-related 
problems‖ and an assessment of cost and schedule as ―high risk‖ (Government 
Accountability Office, 2010).  This update delivers an adequate amount of new 
information to update the program‘s SAIMM.  The program has matured significantly in 
the mission focus character, but continues to suffer from a lack of realism.  Stability has 
improved to a lesser degree as the maturity of the design and requirements is high, but 
discipline remains unchanged due to continued problems and unknowns with the flight 
software, and an apparent inability to control and plan the remaining work required.  The 
2010 GAO assessment yields the following SAIMM: 
SBIRS (2008) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.410 0.367
Schedule 0.410 0.000 0.328
Requirements 0.367 0.328 0.000
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Table 26.  SBIRS SAIMM, 2010 
 
Resulting in the following interoperability instantiation: 
Table 27.  SBIRS Instantiation, 2010 
 
Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no self-
interoperability, the interoperability measurement yields: 
MISSION FOCUS STABILITY DISCIPLINE REALISM
Level 4 - 
Accordant
Mission success is weighted 
significantly higher than cost and 
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk 
management, test planning, system 
engineering, and funding profiles
Stable budgets, stable requirements, 
stable direction, and low personnel 
turnover are maintained across the 
board; program decisions are constant; 
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a prime contractor) and 
maintains strict adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified and accomplished in a timely, 
realistic, and complete manner; 
minimal rework is required; program 
funding and management reserve is 
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with 
25% management reserve) 
Level 3 - 
Associated
Mission success is weighted higher 
than cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover rarely change and 
remain stable in critical areas; program 
decisions rarely change; technology is 
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
The acquisition team is experienced 
(previous experience on the legacy 
program as a major subcontractor) and 
maintains adherence to proven 
programmatic and system engineering 
processes
Program estimates are independently 
verified; rework is rarely required; 
program funding is unrealistic 
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost 
confidence) with realistic management 
reserve (20% or greater)
Level 2 - 
Structured
Mission success is weighted equally to 
cost and schedule
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change occasionally 
in a few minor areas; program decisions 
change occasionally; technology 
requires maturation (TRL 5)
The acquisition team has some 
experience (previous experience on a 
similar program as a subcontractor) and 
utilizes proven processes in most areas
Program estimates are independently 
verified but unrealistic in a few minor 
areas; rework is occasionally required; 
program funding is unrealistic (50/50 
cost confidence) with realistic 
management reserve (20% or greater)
Level 1 - 
Aligned
Cost and schedule are weighted higher 
than mission success
Budgets, requirements, direction or 
personnel turnover change frequently 
in several critical areas; program 
decisions change frequently; 
technology requires significant 
maturation (TRL 4)
The acquisition team has limited 
experience (previous experience on a 
portion of a similar program) and has 
knowledge of proven processes but 
does not use them consistently
Program estimates are unrealistic in 
several critical areas; rework is 
frequently required; program funding 
is unrealistic with inadequate (less 
than 20%) management reserve
Level 0 - 
Separated
Cost and schedule are weighted 
significantly higher than mission 
success
Budgets, requirements, direction and 
personnel turnover continually change 
in many critical areas; program 
decisions continually change; 
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
The acquisition team has no experience 
(first-ever program) and does not have 
access to proven processes (they do not 
exist)
Program estimates are unrealistic and 
focused on program advocacy; rework 
is continually required; program 
funding is unrealistic with little or no 
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS
COST, SCHEDULE & REQUIREMENTS
SBIRS (2010) Mission Focus Stability Discipline Realism
Cost 3 3 3 1
Schedule 3 3 3 1
Requirements 3 4 2 1
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Table 28.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2010 
 
Interpreting the Results 
The interoperability measurements for AEHF, NPOESS and SBIRS High 
demonstrate how the SAIMM can be used to measure a space acquisition program‘s 
interoperability maturity, and then measure interoperability between its major systems.  
The measurements also show how the interoperability can change over time and with 
respect to program phases.  A specific tie between the interoperability measurement and 
actual cost, schedule and requirements performance has not been directly established, but 
is indirectly captured by using the examples of the past.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that a measurement of a failed program‘s interoperability can provide a baseline 
from which to compare other programs‘ interoperability and chance of success or failure. 
For AEHF, interoperability measurements were provided in 2003 and 2010.  
According to GAO reports, during that time the program‘s overall cost nearly doubled 
from 4.8 to 10.4 billion dollars and the predicted launch date slipped approximately four 
years.  The interoperability measurements also exhibit dramatic differences: 
Table 29.  AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2003 
 
SBIRS (2010) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.625 0.515
Schedule 0.625 0.000 0.515
Requirements 0.515 0.515 0.000
AEHF (2003) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.191 0.138
Schedule 0.191 0.000 0.176
Requirements 0.138 0.176 0.000
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Table 30.  AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2010 
 
The program launched shortly after the 2010 interoperability measurement was taken.  It 
is expected that a program‘s interoperability measurement will converge to 1 as it 
approaches a launch since most of the mandatory reviews and maturity gates for the 
program will have been passed.  Accordingly, an increase in the program‘s measure of 
interoperability indicates an increase the program‘s mission readiness. 
The NPOESS program experienced extreme difficulties and was eventually 
cancelled as a result.  According to GAO records, the program cost estimate was 6.1 
billion dollars in 2003, but ballooned to 13.1 billion dollars in 2010.  During this same 
period, the predicted launch date moved from 2009 to 2014.  The 2003 NPOESS 
interoperability scores are reasonably close to the 2003 AEHF scores, and point toward 
significant program issues and a severely hampered ability to achieve cost, schedule and 
performance goals. 
Table 31.  NPOESS Interoperability Measurement, 2009 
 
The SBIRS High program is a notorious example of inability to meet cost, 
schedule and performance goals.  Between 2003 and 2010, the program‘s cost grew by 
AEHF (2010) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.750 0.669
Schedule 0.750 0.000 0.669
Requirements 0.669 0.669 0.000
NPOESS - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.257 0.188
Schedule 0.257 0.000 0.203
Requirements 0.188 0.203 0.000
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5.1 billion dollars and the launch date slipped approximately four years.  Unit cost grew 
by almost two billion dollars.  The program‘s interoperability scores were lower than 
both the AEHF and NPOESS scores in 2003 due to severe problems across all 
interoperability characters: 
Table 32.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2003 
 
In 2008, the program improved in three out of four areas, but continued to place mission 
success at risk due to cost and schedule goals and constraints.  The program was readying 
for launch, but the interoperability scores did not exhibit a level of interoperability 
maturity comparable to AEHF just prior to its launch in 2010:  
Table 33.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2008 
 
This difference in interoperability maturity reflects the substantial risks and issues 
remaining on the program.  In 2010, the program continued to experience problems due 
to flight software issues.  The GAO and other independent estimates stressed a lack of 
realism in the program‘s ability and plan to resolve the problem.  Despite a marked 
increase in the mission focus, stability and discipline characters, the program remained 
SBIRS (2003) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.154 0.103
Schedule 0.154 0.000 0.094
Requirements 0.103 0.094 0.000
SBIRS (2008) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.410 0.367
Schedule 0.410 0.000 0.328
Requirements 0.367 0.328 0.000
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less interoperable in the realism character.  The interoperability scores again indicated 
improvement, but did not reach the same level as AEHF just prior to their launch: 
Table 34.  SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2010 
 
The SBIRS High program now projects a launch date in early 2011. 
These high-level correlations between a program‘s interoperability score and its 
resulting performance reveal the interoperability measurement‘s ability to serve as a 
leading indicator for space acquisition success or failure.  The measurement also provides 
insight into where interoperability can be improved to increase chances of program 
success. 
Summary 
A method to measure space acquisition interoperation, using system 
interoperability, was developed based upon Ford‘s interoperability measurement work.  
The measurement was facilitated by a maturity model that was built using the lessons 
learned and best practices from space acquisition failures of the past.  The method 
measured interoperability between space acquisition systems, S = {cost, schedule, 
requirements}, using key and driving acquisition characters, X = {mission focus, stability, 
discipline, realism} based on five character state levels, C = {separated, aligned, 
structured, associated, accordant}, and applied to three specific acquisition programs.  
The resulting measurements were then compared to demonstrate how the method can be 
SBIRS (2010) - Sim Real Cost Schedule Requirements
Cost 0.000 0.625 0.515
Schedule 0.625 0.000 0.515
Requirements 0.515 0.515 0.000
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used as a leading indicator of the program‘s ability to execute the required level of 
performance on time and within budget.
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
…a host of problems not previously viewed as interoperability related can now be looked at 
as such. This means that many old problems can be solved in a new way, possibly lending 
insight or providing a means of reporting progress not previously available. 
 
—Thomas C. Ford (Ford, 2008) 
 
This is a logical and progressive evolution in warfare, yet its tenets remain 
undemonstrated and unproven…The network-centric warfare objective needs further 
investigation and technological exploitation for it to be…a workable system. 
 
—Lt. Col. Edmund C. Blash, USAR (Blash, 2003) 
Conclusions of Research 
Ford‘s interoperability measurement using a maturity model is indeed a powerful 
tool that can be used to measure the quality of acquisition system interactions.  As Ford 
notes, ―SimReal has the capability of yielding very precise similarity measures of system 
instantiations limited only by the number of characters and the precision of those 
characters‘ states‖ (Ford, 2008).  In this case, the maturity model dictates the number and 
precision of characters.  The SAIMM was built upon experts‘ analysis of past space 
acquisition failures and their recommendations for improvement.  In other words, the 
SAIMM captures the specific system attributes that must be present and mature in order 
for a program to avoid the mistakes of past space acquisition programs.  These attributes 
are universal and may be applied to any major space acquisition program, but the model‘s 
precision suffers as a result.  As such, a SAIMM facilitated interoperability measurement 
is best used on a macro level to gage a program‘s health and status. 
The SAIMM is principally based upon the lessons learned from space acquisition 
program failures, and does not consider expert analysis of programs that were deemed 
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successful.  Finding examples of program successes is extremely difficult due to the 
extent and complexity of space acquisition programs, and little, if any expert analyses 
exist in the publically available literature.  The SAIMM is valuable because it is based on 
the cause and effect of real-world events, but it is important to note that SAIMM is rooted 
in lessons learned almost exclusively from programs that failed to meet their goals.  
Future versions of the SAIMM or similar models must strive to capture and incorporate 
evidence from program successes to improve the robustness and richness of the model. 
In conclusion, the concept of acquisition interoperability was described and linked 
to program success or failure by utilizing a maturity model based upon past space 
acquisition experience.  The method was demonstrated by measuring the interoperability 
between the cost, schedule and requirement systems in three major space programs 
during various acquisition phases.  The results were compared to validate the utility of 
the method as a potential leading indicator of space acquisition success or failure.  LTC 
Blash‘s caveat must be heeded however; ―further investigation‖ is indeed required to 
mature the model and understand the relationship between interoperability and program 
performance before it can be used as an effective space acquisition metric. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Ford states that ―The flexibility of the method supports the instantiation of 
systems at any level of abstraction, with resultant interoperability measurements at any 
desired level of precision.‖  The SAIMM and resulting interoperability measurements are 
captured at a very high level of abstraction and should only be used at the macro level.  
Future research is needed to increase the depth and breadth of the SAIMM in order to 
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enable a more precise measurement.  As alluded to earlier, the bulk of the publically 
available knowledge on space acquisition focuses on programs that have or are currently 
not meeting their cost, schedule and performance targets.  Very few analyses of 
―successful‖ space acquisition programs have been conducted, and the addition of lessons 
learned based on successful programs will improve the SAIMM‘s ability to properly 
characterize a space program‘s acquisition interoperability.  Additionally, the bulk of the 
information used to build the SAIMM was supplied by the GAO and independent review 
teams led by Mr. Tom Young.  Although extremely valuable, there are other sources of 
data that can be used to improve the SAIMM‘s precision.  This may limit the ability of 
the material to be publically released, but would still provide benefit to most government 
entities. 
Further research must also consider the fundamental building blocks of SAIMM 
and the interoperability measurements used in this thesis.  Additional systems and 
characters, to include the way they are captured in the model itself, can mature the 
SAIMM for both generic and specific purposes.  Further decomposition of the cost, 
schedule and requirements systems could improve the precision of the SAIMM.  For 
example, the requirements system could be broken into the requirements (user-centric) 
and design (program office-centric) systems.  The purpose and context of the 
measurement, as well as increased knowledge of lessons learned will reveal new and 
important characters for consideration.  The interoperation between the cost, schedule 
and requirement‘s systems processes, methods and tools should be considered, as well as 
the influence of the systems‘ interoperation in the flexibility and transparency characters. 
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It is also recommended that future research further leverage the benefit of 
hindsight to solidify and better quantify the relationship between acquisition system 
interoperability and a program‘s cost, schedule and performance.  One possible way to do 
this would be to build a baseline of interoperability measurements across many space 
acquisition programs during various acquisition phases.  This baseline of interoperability 
measurements could then be compared to the actual cost, schedule and mission 
performance of the programs to infer a cost per unit of interoperability metric.  A simple 
example might consider how much a program‘s interoperability improved or declined 
between systems, and how much cost, schedule or performance was impacted as a result.  
This effort would likely require extensive analysis and a more precise SAIMM in order to 
produce meaningful results.   
An analysis of how the program‘s acquisition phase and context affects the 
interoperability measurement and program performance would also serve as a valuable 
contribution to this area of research.  Ford states (Ford, 2008): 
Interoperability is generally time variant. For example, atmospheric effects due to 
the changes from night to day will degrade the optical interoperability of 
reconnaissance satellites and ground targets. Similarly, the directional 
interoperability of an attacker and his target may increase as the attacker has 
ingressed long enough to come in range of the target. Finally, end-to-end 
computer interoperability may improve or diminish with changes in network 
congestion tied to worker shift changes, lunchtime usage, etc.  
 
Within the context of space acquisitions, it is important to consider how the 
interoperability characters vary in time based on the program‘s acquisition phase.  For 
instance, the character stability may prove to be more valuable later in a program‘s life 
than earlier.  It should also be recognized that the characters selected for the SAIMM may 
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not adequately capture the interoperability needs across the program‘s acquisition 
lifecycle.  Additional characters may need to be developed to fully portray the key and 
driving interoperability factors during each phase of the acquisition program. 
The concept above could be expanded to include statistical predictions based 
upon the baseline of past space acquisition experience.  Distribution models or Monte 
Carlo analysis could be used to correlate interoperability measurements against actual 
program performance.  A series of probability curves or other tools could then link a 
measurement of a current program‘s acquisition system interoperability to a probability 
of success or failure, i.e. program x‘s interoperability score of y between the cost and 
schedule systems indicates the program has a 65% chance of exceeding its current 
budget. 
Finally, it is recommended that prospective research consider how the acquisition 
interoperability measurement be incorporated into a larger framework of metrics, most 
likely driven by the ―Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Guide‖ referred to earlier. 
Summary 
This research combines the power of Ford‘s interoperability measurement with 
the lessons harvested from decades of space acquisition experience, and as such, is 
inherently tied to overall acquisition effectiveness.  It provides a way to characterize a 
program‘s health by measuring its ability to interoperate between the cost, schedule and 
requirements systems.  The measurement can be used as a leading indicator of program 
performance, a guide to locate and solve issues, and can be tailored for use in many 
different contexts and situations. 
 
72 
There appears to be great utility and power in this measurement, but much work 
remains to be done in order to operationalize it.  The institutions responsible for space 
program execution, and more importantly, delivering capability to the warfighter and our 
nation, must continue to foster and invest in ways to measure and improve programmatic 
and system engineering rigor. 
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Appendix A – Independent Assessments of AEHF, NPOESS and SBIRS High 
In 2003, the GAO assessed the AEHF program‘s status as follows (Government 
Accountability Office, 2003): 
2003 GAO reported in the early phases of the program, DOD substantially and 
frequently altered its requirements; the system design changed. While considered 
necessary, some changes increased costs by hundred of millions of dollars and 
caused scheduling delays. 
 
2003 GAO reported that once DOD decided to accelerate its plans to build the 
satellites, the contractors proposed and DOD agreed to support a high-risk 
schedule that turned out to be overly optimistic and highly compressed—leaving 
little room for error and depending on a chain of events taking place at certain 
times. Substantial delays occurred when some events, such as the award of the 
contract or the availability of equipment, did not occur on time. In commenting 
on the AEHF report, DOD noted the decision to accelerate the program was based 
on a satellite constellation gap caused by the loss of a Milstar satellite. DOD also 
stated many in DOD expressed concern about the risks, but believed the risk was 
acceptable based on information known at the time. 
 
2003 GAO reported that at the time DOD decided to accelerate the program, it did 
not have the funding needed to support the activities and manpower needed to 
design and build the satellites quicker. The lack of funding also contributed to 
schedule delays, which in turn, caused more cost increases. 
 
2003 GAO reported that the program demonstrated most technology knowledge at 
development with 11 of 12 critical technologies having reached maturity 
according to best practice standards.  However, the program office did not project 
achieving maturity on the remaining technology—the phased array antenna— by 
the design review in June 2004 and did not have a backup capability. Program 
officials assessed the software development for the mission control system as 
moderate risk and have developed a risk mitigation strategy.  However, until these 
mitigation actions are completed, software may be at risk for unplanned cost and 
schedule growth. 
 
2003 GAO reported that significant design changes affected cost and delayed the 
AEHF schedule.  For example, software growth occurred as more requirements 
were added and as the design of the system stabilized. These increases in software 
requirements for both the satellite and the mission control segments increased the 
software cost estimate by over 77 percent or about $223 million. 
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The GAO provided a brief synopsis of the AEHF program‘s status just prior to the 
launch of AEHF-1 in August of 2010 (Government Accountability Office, 2010): 
According to the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are mature, 
with all either flight- qualified through test and demonstration or flight- proven 
through successful mission operations. System-level environmental testing for the 
first satellite was completed in July 2009. The AEHF‘s design appears stable with 
all of its expected design drawings released. 
 
…during initial system level environmental testing for the first and second 
satellites, several flight boxes experienced failures due to defective components 
that required removal, repair, and reinstallation. Because of the number of 
components that had to be removed and reinstalled, the first satellite had to 
undergo an additional round of system-level environmental tests. These actions 
delayed the first launch almost 2 years and increased program cost. According to 
the program office, the additional testing was successfully completed in July 
2009. The second satellite also completed system level environmental testing in 
2009, and no new problems or issues were discovered. 
 
An independent review team, led by Mr. Tom Young, assessed the NPOESS 
program in 2009 (NPOESS Independent Review Team, 2009): 
The priorities of NOAA, NASA and DOD/USAF are not aligned: The DOD has 
stated that while the program should continue to pursue the current NPOESS 
requirements, the DOD is willing to accept legacy performance (DMSP and 
POES) to maintain continuity, cost and schedule goals and is not willing to 
provide additional funding to pursue requirements beyond legacy. NOAA states 
that legacy performance would be a step back in today‘s performance because of 
their current operational use of NASA research satellites that are well beyond 
their design life 
 
NPOESS is being managed with cost as the most important parameter: One 
observation of this cost priority is reflected in the award fee structure and its 
emphasis on cost control. Successful space acquisition requires mission success 
to be the top priority not cost as the overarching factor 
 
The PEO and IPO do not have sufficient space systems acquisition expertise 
and processes: The NPOESS program is not part of a supporting space systems 
acquisition center, such as the AF Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) or 
the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). These types of established 
space acquisition organizations can provide institutional knowledge, robust 
infrastructure support, and a cadre of seasoned space systems acquisition experts 
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Funding shortfalls are causing the IPO to make short-sighted decisions to cover 
VIIRS cost growth and stay within allocated budget at a significant increase to 
outyear costs and program risks: While the IPO has no choice but to make these 
decisions, risk is being deliberately built into the program to stay within allocated 
budget. 
 
The current budget is inadequate: Budgeting to a 50-50 cost estimate leads to 
insufficient funding. It lacks sufficient management reserve, and as noted in 
Finding #6, this leads to programs using risk as its management reserve. The 
current budget is not at the 50/50 level. The most probable cost is at the 80/20 
level including reserves 
 
The SBIRS program has been reviewed numerous times by the GAO and other 
entities.  The 2003 GAO report lists the following findings (Government Accountability 
Office, 2003): 
History of moving forward without sufficient knowledge to ensure that the 
product design is stable and meets performance requirements and that adequate 
resources are available 
 
The program passed its critical design review with only 50 percent of its design 
drawings completed, compared to 90 percent as recommended by best practices. 
Consequently, several design modifications were necessary, including 39 to the 
first of two infrared sensors to reduce excessive noise created by electromagnetic 
interference—a threat to the host satellite‘s functionality—delaying delivery of 
the sensor by 10 months or more 
 
The program was too immature to enter the system design and development 
phase. Program activation was based on faulty and overly optimistic assumptions 
about software reuse and productivity levels, the benefits of commercial practices, 
management stability, and the level of understanding of requirements. 
 
The complexity of developing engineering solutions to meet system requirements 
was not well understood by program and contracting officials. The systems 
integration effort was significantly underestimated in terms of complexity and the 
associated impacts. In addition, the requirements refinement process was ad hoc, 
creating uncertainty on the status of program priorities and affecting cost and 
schedule. 
 
Breakdown in execution and management. Overly optimistic assumptions and 
unclear requirements eventually overwhelmed government and contractor 
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management. The 2-year delay of the GEO satellite launches, which occurred in 
1998, contributed to management instability and was a factor in the Program 
Office and the contractor having to spend 25 of the first 60 months of the contract 
on replanning activities. 
 
The Department of Defense was tasked by Congress to provide a report on the 
SBIRS High program‘s status in 2005 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005) which 
listed the following findings: 
Latent defects, resulting from insufficient product assurance activity in earlier 
design and production activities…lack of sound system engineering processes and 
procedures 
 
Insufficient schedule and budget to ensure robust GEO first article integration/ 
test…insufficient time scheduled for GEO system integration and test; SPO 
concluded the ground software productivity levels were optimistic; the flight 
software architecture was not sufficiently defined to allow software coding; and 
inadequate on-orbit checkout time was planned. Finally, the resources and tools 
for simulations, analysis, and troubleshooting were inadequate and required more 
effort 
 
Process escapes due to human error/insufficient training/fragile 
processes…improper or inadequate processes, insufficient training, questionable 
inspection practices, and/or human error as causal factors. Recent events include 
excess debris or contamination in delivered hardware, improper use of soldering 
materials, improper installation of thermal blankets, and missing test procedure 
documentation 
 
A poor design and build implementation to comply with the EMI specifications of 
the HEO P/L…flawed design approach 
 
Faulty hardware and software design of the HEO/GEO flight computers, i.e., the 
single board computer ‗halt‘ anomalies…hardware design problem with a control 
signal on an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) 
 
An inadequate architecture design and a flawed flight software development plan 
for the GEO satellite‘s Signal Processing Assembly (SPA)…state of the software 
architecture, a very aggressive contractor schedule, and inadequate planning 
The GAO again assessed the SBIRS High program in 2008 following a setback 
with the program‘s flight software (Government Accountability Office, 2008): 
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While DOD has estimated that the SBIRS program will be delayed by 15 months 
and cost $414 million to resolve the software problems, those estimates appear 
too optimistic, given the cost and schedule risks involved. For example, SBIRS 
contractors‘ report low confidence that software can be produced in time to meet 
the December 2009 satellite launch goal. Further, DOD and the contractor face 
significant challenges and risks that could result in more time and money being 
required to meet program goals, to include the bypassing of some disciplined 
software practices that add risk to cost and schedule. Finally, as of August 2008, 
DOD reported that SBIRS was already behind schedule on some software 
development efforts, and thousands of activities remain that must be integrated 
and tested across various systems, with cost and schedule implications, if 
problems or unintended consequences occur. 
 
The GAO‘s annual assessment of selected programs revealed a higher level of 
technical maturity for SBIRS High, but still maintained concerns about the ability of the 
program to adhere to its cost and schedule (Government Accountability Office, 2010): 
The SBIRS High program began system development in 1996 with none of its 
three critical technologies mature. All three critical technologies—the infrared 
sensor, thermal management, and on-board processing—are now mature and have 
been demonstrated in at least a relevant environment. Furthermore, according to 
the program office, the HEO sensor‘s on-orbit performance instills confidence 
that the GEO infrared scanning sensor will work as intended. 
 
According to program officials, 99 percent of the SBIRS High expected design 
drawings are now releasable. However, the program continues to experience 
design-related problems, and more could emerge. For example, flight software 
design problems have plagued the program for several years, causing cost 
increases and schedule delays, and the program may still be underestimating the 
amount of work that remains to resolve the issues. 
 
According to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), unplanned 
work continues to be a challenge for the software development effort and its cost 
and schedule have been assessed as high risk. 
 
The SBIRS High program remains at high risk for cost and schedule growth. 
DCMA is currently projecting over $245 million in cost overrun from the current 
baseline at contract completion. This amount has more than doubled in the past 
year and continues to steadily grow. 
 
Additional contractor cost increases and schedule delays are expected due in part 
to hardware rework on the first satellite, continued difficulty with the flight 
 
79 
software development, and delays in integration and test activities. The program‘s 
management reserve— funds set aside to address unanticipated problems— will 
likely be depleted before the first GEO satellite launches, and additional funding 
could be required if future problems occur. Additional schedule delays could also 
occur since meeting current launch estimates depends on the results of system-
level integration tests. 
 
According to the program office, the first GEO integrated payload and spacecraft 
successfully completed thermal vacuum (TVAC) testing in November 2009. 
Program officials say these testing results give them high confidence that the 
GEO satellite will perform similarly to the successful HEO sensors, noting that 
HEO TVAC test performance differed only slightly from its on-orbit 
performance. 
 
Program officials say that although technical issues discovered during testing 
have increased program cost, parallel activities have actually minimized program 
cost and schedule growth. They further stressed that mission assurance remains 
their top priority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
Appendix B – Space Acquisition Cost and Schedule Challenges
 
Figure 8.  Space Program Cost Growth (Government Accountability Office, 2010) 
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Figure 9.  Space Program Unit Cost Growth (Government Accountability Office, 
2010) 
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Figure 10.  Space Program Schedule Delays (Government Accountability Office, 
2010) 
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Appendix C – A Summary of Space Acquisition Findings and Root Causes 
Table 35.  Space Acquisition Lessons Learned 
System or 
Subject 
Failure // Root Cause Year Source 
AEHF early phases of the AEHF program, DOD 
substantially and frequently altered requirements; 
DOD decided to accelerate its plans to build the 
AEHF satellites, high risk schedule that turned out to 
be overly optimistic and highly compressed-leaving 
little room for error; did not have the funding needed 
to support the activities and the manpower needed to 
design and build the satellites quicker 
2003 GAO - Military Space 
Operations: Common 
Problems and Their 
Effects on Satellite and 
Related Acquisitions 
Distributed 
Common 
Ground-
Surface 
System 
(DCGS) 
DOD has been slow to plan for this initiative and it 
has not addressed important questions such as how 
and when systems will be pared down and modified 
as well as how the initiative will be funded. 
Moreover, DOD is fielding new systems and new 
versions of old systems without following its own 
certification process 
2003 GAO - Steps Needed 
to Ensure 
Interoperability of 
Systems That Process 
Intelligence Data 
Distributed 
Common 
Ground-
Surface 
System 
(DCGS) 
incompatible data formats, process for testing and 
certifying that systems will be interoperable is not 
working effectively // lack of an overarching test 
plan 
2003 GAO - Steps Needed 
to Ensure 
Interoperability of 
Systems That Process 
Intelligence Data 
GOES, 
lessons 
learned 
incorporation 
establish realistic cost and schedule estimates 2006 GAO - Steps Remain 
in Incorporating 
Lessons Learned from 
Other Satellite 
Programs 
GOES, 
lessons 
learned 
incorporation 
ensure sufficient technical readiness of the system‘s 
components prior to key decisions // GOES I-M 
series, NOAA and NASA did not require 
engineering analyses prior to awarding the 
development contracts in order to 
accelerate the schedule and launch the first satellite. 
The lack of these studies resulted in unexpected 
technical issues in later acquisition phases—
including the inability of the original instrument 
designs to withstand the temperature variations in the 
geostationary orbit 
2006 GAO - Steps Remain 
in Incorporating 
Lessons Learned from 
Other Satellite 
Programs 
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GOES, 
lessons 
learned 
incorporation 
provide sufficient management at government and 
contractor levels // The key drivers of poor 
management included inadequate systems 
engineering and earned value management 
capabilities, unsuitable allocation of contract award 
fees, inadequate levels of management reserve, and 
inefficient decision-making and reporting structure 
within the program office 
2006 GAO - Steps Remain 
in Incorporating 
Lessons Learned from 
Other Satellite 
Programs 
GOES, 
lessons 
learned 
incorporation 
perform adequate senior executive oversight to 
ensure mission success // lack of timely decisions 
and regular involvement of senior executive 
management was a critical factor in the program‘s 
rapid cost and schedule growth 
2006 GAO - Steps Remain 
in Incorporating 
Lessons Learned from 
Other Satellite 
Programs 
GOES-R risks hardware that is to be used for the ground segment is 
mature, key components have not previously been 
integrated.  Consequently, if the components do not 
work together, the program might have to procure 
separate antennas, which would impact the 
program‘s cost and schedule 
2009 GAO - Acquisition Is 
Under Way, but 
Improvements Needed 
in Management and 
Oversight 
GOES-R risks Advanced Baseline Imager estimates that the 
instrument is over 50 percent complete and reports 
that it has experienced technical issues, including 
problems with the quality of components in the focal 
plane module, mirrors, and telescope.  none has yet 
been demonstrated in a lab or test environment, the 
risk remains that the technologies are not sufficiently 
mature 
2009 GAO - Acquisition Is 
Under Way, but 
Improvements Needed 
in Management and 
Oversight 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
lack of an overall investment strategy; tendency to 
set start dates for programs before a sound business 
case for them has been established; DOD starts more 
programs than it can afford and rarely prioritizes 
them for funding purposes; Such an approach has 
cascading effects—from creating negative behaviors 
associated with competing for funds, to increasing 
technology challenges, to creating unanticipated and 
disruptive funding shifts, to stretching out schedules 
in order to accommodate the whole portfolio of 
space programs 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• DOD starts more programs than it can afford over 
the long run, forcing programs to underestimate costs 
and overpromise capability. This was attributed to 
both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Air Force. The September 11, 2001, terror attacks on 
the United States spurred DOD to attempt to pursue 
even more satellite programs, believing that there 
was now a greater need for persistent surveillance 
and more robust communication and networking 
capabilities. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
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Incentives & 
Pressures 
• When faced with a lower budget, senior executives 
within Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air 
Force would rather make across-the board cuts to all 
space programs than hard decisions as to which ones 
to keep and which ones to cancel or cut back. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Because programs are funded annually and 
priorities have not been established, competition for 
funding continues over time, forcing programs to 
view success as the ability to secure the next 
installment rather than the end goal of delivering 
capabilities when and as promised. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• More often than not, DOD seeks substantial leaps 
in capability versus incremental leaps. While this 
approach helps a program to gain support, it 
substantially increases the technical challenge and 
the level of unknowns about a program at the time it 
is started. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Having to continually ―sell‖ a program also creates 
incentives to suppress bad news about the program‘s 
status and avoid activities that uncover bad news. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Launching demonstrators in space is a good way to 
reduce risks and learn about technologies before 
starting a new acquisition program. But because of 
the high cost of testing technologies in space and the 
overall competition for funding, programs are 
incentivized not to pursue this approach. At the same 
time, resources outside acquisition programs devoted 
to testing in an operational environment are 
declining. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• DOD faces resource shortages beyond funding 
because it starts more programs than it can afford. 
Principally, it does not have a sufficient workforce to 
support space acquisitions or experienced program 
managers to guide them. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
diverse array of officials and organizations involved 
with the acquisition process, tensions between the 
S&T and acquisition communities as to who is better 
suited to translate technology concepts into reality 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
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Incentives & 
Pressures 
• The lengthy development period required for space 
systems puts pressure on program managers to 
continually develop technologies. There is a fear that 
if these technologies do not reach maturity during 
this time frame, they will be outdated by the time the 
satellites are ready to be launched. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Once a program has formally begun, it is easier to 
secure current and future years‘ funding. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Satellites tend to last longer than expected, and they 
cannot be retrieved for upgrades, putting more 
pressure on programs to push for attaining as much 
technological capability as possible within the 
acquisition program. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• The acquisition community does not believe that 
labs in charge of developing space technologies 
adequately understand its needs—in terms of 
capabilities and time frames—and would rather 
pursue its own goals. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Program managers also believe that they would 
have more control over technology development if it 
was conducted by contractors who answered to them 
rather than to DOD labs. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• DOD has not had an effective strategy for steering 
activities within the S&T community to ensure that 
they will eventually fit in with acquisition needs. 
(Note: DOD has recently developed a space S&T 
strategy. We reported on this effort in January 2005.) 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
pressures resulting from short tenures among staff 
critical to achieving acquisition success, and 
difficulties in overseeing contractors 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
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Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Nonincumbent contractors are often able to submit 
a lower price than the incumbent because they can be 
optimistic without being challenged by DOD. These 
optimistic estimates enable them to win new 
contracts. At the same time, however, 
nonincumbents are not necessarily the best 
organizations to carry out the development program, 
particularly because they do not have the technical 
and management experience associated with the 
legacy system being replaced. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Industry has been consolidated to a point where 
there may be only one company that can develop a 
needed component for a satellite system. This has 
enabled contractors to hold some programs hostage. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Program managers are often not equipped to 
understand what is behind a contractor‘s proposal, 
particularly because contractors are not likely to 
disclose technical risks and highlight other negative 
aspects. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Industry puts pressure on programs to have 
contractors develop critical technologies within an 
acquisition environment versus having the labs do it. 
When labs build technologies, the government 
allows the contractors that work on the system that 
would ultimately use the technologies to scrap them 
in favor of employing their own methods and 
expertise. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Program managers are not always experienced 
enough to stand up to contractors when development 
is being mismanaged. Program managers also may 
not understand the best ways to incentivize 
contractors and gain insight into their performance. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Contractors are facing workforce pressures similar 
to those experienced by the government, that is, not 
enough technical expertise to develop highly 
complex space systems. (Our recent report on space 
S&T echoed this concern as well, pointing out that 
several studies have found that both industry and the 
U.S. government face substantial shortages of 
scientists and engineers and that recruitment of new 
personnel is difficult because the space industry is 
one of many sectors competing for the limited 
number of trained scientists and engineers.) 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
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Incentives & 
Pressures 
• Some space programs are facing pressures related 
to funding and technology development because of 
an expectation widely held in the 1990s that the 
commercial space market would experience a boom. 
At the time, DOD decreased funding for some 
capabilities, principally space launch, assuming the 
market could pay for a portion of research and 
development and that economies of scale would 
result. It also relied on the commercial sector to 
develop knowledge about production of satellites 
that eventually were purchased as part of the 
Wideband Gapfiller Satellite program. However, 
when anticipated commercial orders using the same 
technologies did not pan out, the government 
experienced unanticipated schedule delays. 
2005 GAO - Defense 
Acquisitions: 
Incentives and 
Pressures That Drive 
Problems Affecting 
Satellite and Related 
Acquisitions 
NPOESS requirements setting problems attributable to the 
broad base of internal customers each agency has 
and the diversity of requirements that needed to be 
met 
2003 GAO - Military Space 
Operations: Common 
Problems and Their 
Effects on Satellite and 
Related Acquisitions 
NPOESS NPOESS is being managed with cost as the most 
important parameter: One observation of this cost 
priority is reflected in the award fee structure and its 
emphasis on cost control. Successful space 
acquisition requires mission success to be the top 
priority not cost as the overarching factor 
2009 NPOESS Independent 
Review Team 
NPOESS The EXCOM process is ineffective: The EXCOM is 
intended to be a decision body to provide 
streamlined direction to the PEO. The current DOD 
EXCOM representative has not been delegated the 
proper authority from the Defense Acquisition 
Executive (DAE), who is also the NPOESS 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), and decisions 
require an additional meeting and coordination to be 
finalized 
2009 NPOESS Independent 
Review Team 
NPOESS The PEO and IPO do not have sufficient space 
systems acquisition expertise and processes: The 
NPOESS program is not part of a supporting space 
systems acquisition center, such as the AF Space and 
Missile Systems Center (SMC) or the NASA 
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). These types 
of established space acquisition organizations can 
provide institutional knowledge, robust infrastructure 
support, and a cadre of seasoned space systems 
acquisition experts 
2009 NPOESS Independent 
Review Team 
NPOESS Funding shortfalls are causing the IPO to make 
short-sighted decisions to cover VIIRS cost growth 
and stay within allocated budget at a significant 
increase to outyear costs and program risks: While 
the IPO has no choice but to make these decisions, 
risk is being deliberately built into the program to 
stay within allocated budget. 
2009 NPOESS Independent 
Review Team 
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NPOESS The priorities of NOAA, NASA and DOD/USAF are 
not aligned: The DOD has stated that while the 
program should continue to pursue the current 
NPOESS requirements, the DOD is willing to accept 
legacy performance (DMSP and POES) to maintain 
continuity, cost and schedule goals and is not willing 
to provide additional funding to pursue requirements 
beyond legacy. NOAA states that legacy 
performance would be a step back in today‘s 
performance because of their current operational use 
of NASA research satellites that are well beyond 
their design life 
2009 NPOESS Independent 
Review Team 
NPOESS The current budget is inadequate: Budgeting to a 50-
50 cost estimate leads to insufficient funding. It lacks 
sufficient management reserve, and as noted in 
Finding #6, this leads to programs using risk as its 
management reserve. The current budget is not at the 
50/50 level. The most probable cost is at the 80/20 
level including reserves 
2009 NPOESS Independent 
Review Team 
NPOESS Committee lacks the membership and leadership 
needed to effectively and efficiently oversee and 
direct the program. Specifically, the DOD 
Committee member with acquisition authority does 
not attend Executive Committee meetings—and 
sometimes contradicts the Committee‘s decisions, 
the Committee does not track its action items to 
closure, and many of the Committee‘s decisions do 
not achieve desired outcomes // DOD‘s acquisition 
authority has never attended an Executive 
Committee meeting. This individual delegated the 
responsibility for attending the meetings—but not 
the authority to make acquisition decisions—to the 
Under Secretary of the Air Force // agreements 
between committee members have been overturned 
by the acquisition authority, leading to significant 
delays // NPOESS Executive Committee generally 
took immediate action to mitigate the risks that were 
brought before them; however, a majority of these 
actions were not effective—that is, they did not fully 
resolve the underlying issues or result in a successful 
outcome // interagency disagreements and differing 
priorities 
2009 GAO - With Costs 
Increasing and Data 
Continuity at Risk, 
Improvements Needed 
in Tri-agency Decision 
Making 
NPOESS Specifically, ongoing challenges with VIIRS 
development, design, and workmanship have led to 
additional cost overruns and delayed the instrument‘s 
delivery to NPP 
2009 GAO - With Costs 
Increasing and Data 
Continuity at Risk, 
Improvements Needed 
in Tri-agency Decision 
Making 
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NPOESS problems discovered during environmental testing on 
CrIS led the contractor to further delay its delivery to 
NPP and added further unanticipated costs to the 
program 
2009 GAO - With Costs 
Increasing and Data 
Continuity at Risk, 
Improvements Needed 
in Tri-agency Decision 
Making 
NPOESS risks Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective 
NPOESS Management Structure, but Executive 
Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing Problems 
Remain 
2007 GAO - 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
SATELLITE 
ACQUISITIONS 
Progress and 
Challenges 
NPOESS risks Space Segment—Progress Made, but Key Sensors 
Continue to Face Major Risks // VIIRS - completed 
environmental tests of VIIRS‘s engineering design 
unit (a prototype) (1) band-to-band co-registration, 
an issue in which band registration shifts with 
different temperatures; (2) cross-talk, which involves 
information from sensor cells leaking into other 
cells; and (3) line-spread function issues, in which 
the instrument‘s focus changes with changes in 
temperature, CrIS - Development of CrIS was put on 
hold in October 2006 when the flight unit designated 
to go on NPP experienced a major structural failure 
during its vibration test 
2007 GAO - 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
SATELLITE 
ACQUISITIONS 
Progress and 
Challenges 
SBIRS program‘s history of moving forward without 
sufficient knowledge to ensure that the product 
design is stable and meets performance requirements 
and that adequate resources are available 
2003 GAO - Despite 
Restructuring, SBIRS 
High Program 
Remains at Risk of 
Cost and Schedule 
Overruns 
SBIRS program passed its critical design review with only 
50 percent of its design drawings completed, 
compared to 90 percent as recommended by best 
practices. Consequently, several design 
modifications were necessary, including 39 to the 
first of two infrared sensors to reduce excessive 
noise created by electromagnetic interference—a 
threat to the host satellite‘s functionality—delaying 
delivery of the sensor by 10 months or more 
2003 GAO - Despite 
Restructuring, SBIRS 
High Program 
Remains at Risk of 
Cost and Schedule 
Overruns 
SBIRS testing of the first infrared sensor revealed several 
deficiencies in the flight software involving the 
sensor‘s ability to maintain earth coverage and track 
missiles while orbiting the earth (flight software still 
major program risk) 
2003 GAO - Despite 
Restructuring, SBIRS 
High Program 
Remains at Risk of 
Cost and Schedule 
Overruns 
SBIRS The program was too immature to enter the system 
design and development phase. Program activation 
was based on faulty and overly optimistic 
assumptions about software reuse and productivity 
levels, the benefits of commercial practices, 
management stability, and the level of understanding 
2003 GAO - Despite 
Restructuring, SBIRS 
High Program 
Remains at Risk of 
Cost and Schedule 
Overruns 
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of requirements. 
SBIRS The complexity of developing engineering solutions 
to meet system requirements was not well 
understood by program and contracting officials. The 
systems integration effort was significantly 
underestimated in terms of complexity and the 
associated impacts. In addition, the requirements 
refinement process was ad hoc, creating uncertainty 
on the status of program priorities and affecting cost 
and schedule. 
2003 GAO - Despite 
Restructuring, SBIRS 
High Program 
Remains at Risk of 
Cost and Schedule 
Overruns 
SBIRS Breakdown in execution and management. Overly 
optimistic assumptions and unclear requirements 
eventually overwhelmed government and contractor 
management. The 2-year delay of the GEO satellite 
launches, which occurred in 1998, contributed to 
management instability and was a factor in the 
Program Office and the contractor having to spend 
25 of the first 60 months of the contract on 
replanning activities. 
2003 GAO - Despite 
Restructuring, SBIRS 
High Program 
Remains at Risk of 
Cost and Schedule 
Overruns 
SBIRS latent defects, resulting from insufficient product 
assurance activity in earlier design and production 
activities // lack of sound system engineering 
processes and procedures 
2005 DOD - Status of the 
Space Based Infrared 
System Program, 
Report to the Defense 
and Intelligence 
Committees 
SBIRS insufficient schedule and budget to ensure robust 
GEO first article integration / test // insufficient time 
scheduled for GEO system integration and test; SPO 
concluded the ground software productivity levels 
were optimistic; the flight software architecture was 
not sufficiently defined to allow software coding; 
and inadequate on-orbit checkout time was planned. 
Finally, the resources and tools for simulations, 
analysis, and troubleshooting were inadequate and 
required more effort 
2005 DOD - Status of the 
Space Based Infrared 
System Program, 
Report to the Defense 
and Intelligence 
Committees 
SBIRS process escapes due to human error / insufficient 
training / fragile processes // improper or inadequate 
processes, insufficient training, questionable 
inspection practices, and/or human error as causal 
factors. Recent events include excess debris or 
contamination in delivered hardware, improper use 
of soldering materials, improper installation of 
thermal blankets, and missing test procedure 
documentation 
2005 DOD - Status of the 
Space Based Infrared 
System Program, 
Report to the Defense 
and Intelligence 
Committees 
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SBIRS A poor design and build implementation to comply 
with the EMI specifications of the HEO P/L // flawed 
design approach 
2005 DOD - Status of the 
Space Based Infrared 
System Program, 
Report to the Defense 
and Intelligence 
Committees 
SBIRS Faulty hardware and software design of the 
HEO/GEO flight computers, i.e., the single board 
computer ‗halt‘ anomalies // hardware design 
problem with a control signal on an Application-
Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) 
2005 DOD - Status of the 
Space Based Infrared 
System Program, 
Report to the Defense 
and Intelligence 
Committees 
SBIRS An inadequate architecture design and a flawed flight 
software development plan for the GEO satellite‘s 
Signal Processing Assembly (SPA) // state of the 
software architecture, a very aggressive contractor 
schedule, and inadequate planning 
2005 DOD - Status of the 
Space Based Infrared 
System Program, 
Report to the Defense 
and Intelligence 
Committees 
SBIRS flight software for the first satellite underwent testing 
and failed; timing of stored programs // test beds that 
had matured in parallel with the flight software and 
hardware, making it difficult to distinguish between 
test bed and software issues; oversubscription of test 
beds and lack of simulation resources that precluded 
them from checking out high-risk areas (timing, and 
stored programs); insufficient modeling of timing, 
and analysis of stored program implementation, 
which might have shed light earlier on lack of 
robustness 
2008 GAO - DOD‘s Goals 
for 
Resolving Space 
Based Infrared System 
Software Problems 
Are Ambitious 
SBIRS flight software for the first satellite underwent testing 
and failed; distribution of control between processors 
// test beds that had matured in parallel with the 
flight software and hardware, making it difficult to 
distinguish between test bed and software issues; 
oversubscription of test beds and lack of simulation 
resources that precluded them from checking out 
high-risk areas (timing, and stored programs); 
insufficient modeling of timing, and analysis of 
stored program implementation, which might have 
shed light earlier on lack of robustness 
2008 GAO - DOD‘s Goals 
for 
Resolving Space 
Based Infrared System 
Software Problems 
Are Ambitious 
SBIRS flight software for the first satellite underwent testing 
and failed; failure at the hardware interface level // // 
test beds that had matured in parallel with the flight 
software and hardware, making it difficult to 
distinguish between test bed and software issues; 
oversubscription of test beds and lack of simulation 
resources that precluded them from checking out 
high-risk areas (timing, and stored programs); 
insufficient modeling of timing, and analysis of 
stored program implementation, which might have 
shed light earlier on lack of robustness 
2008 GAO - DOD‘s Goals 
for 
Resolving Space 
Based Infrared System 
Software Problems 
Are Ambitious 
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SBIRS weaknesses in management responsibility, 
accountability and organizational structure; Air 
Force has limited management control over SBIRS 
2008 GAO - DOD‘s Goals 
for 
Resolving Space 
Based Infrared System 
Software Problems 
Are Ambitious 
SBIRS Lockheed Martin‘s program process discipline is 
poor 
2008 GAO - DOD‘s Goals 
for 
Resolving Space 
Based Infrared System 
Software Problems 
Are Ambitious 
SBIRS Adversarial relationships exist between Air Force 
and Lockheed Martin 
2008 GAO - DOD‘s Goals 
for 
Resolving Space 
Based Infrared System 
Software Problems 
Are Ambitious 
SBIRS Government organizational structure is flawed 
because cost and schedule responsibilities are 
separated 
2008 GAO - DOD‘s Goals 
for 
Resolving Space 
Based Infrared System 
Software Problems 
Are Ambitious 
SBIRS Focal point for FSS completion is needed 2008 GAO - DOD‘s Goals 
for 
Resolving Space 
Based Infrared System 
Software Problems 
Are Ambitious 
SBIRS reasons for the delay include poor government 
oversight of the contractor, technical complexities, 
and rework. The program continues to struggle with 
flight software development, and during testing last 
year, officials discovered hardware defects on the 
first GEO satellite, though the program reports that 
they have been resolved 
2010 GAO - DOD Poised to 
Enhance Space 
Capabilities, but 
Persistent Challenges 
Remain in Developing 
Space Systems 
SBIRS-High • Cost-driven, 
• Underfunded, 
• Optimistic contractor proposal, 
• Uncontrolled requirements, 
• Limited program manager authority and capability, 
• Funding instability (four replans), 
• Program manager instability (four government and 
four industry program 
managers), and 
• Failure to implement ―best practices.‖ 
2003 Defense Science Board 
- Acquisition of 
National Security 
Space Programs 
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SBIRS-High independent review team chartered by DOD to 
examine the reasons behind cost and scheduling 
problems in the SBIRS-High program reported that a 
key root cause was that system requirements were 
not well-understood when the program began and as 
it evolved; requirements setting process was often 
adhoc with many decisions being deferred to the 
contractor. The review team also found that the 
program was too immature to enter system design 
and development. Further, there was too much 
instability on the program after the contract award 
2003 GAO - Military Space 
Operations: Common 
Problems and Their 
Effects on Satellite and 
Related Acquisitions 
Space Radar • Knowledge point 1: A match must be made 
between the customer‘s requirements and the 
developer‘s available resources before product 
development starts. As noted earlier, DOD plans to 
start SBR product development in 2006. 
• Knowledge point 2: The product‘s design must be 
stable and must meet performance requirements 
before initial manufacturing begins. 
• Knowledge point 3: The product must be 
producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets 
and demonstrated to be reliable before production 
begins. 
2004 GAO - DEFENSE 
ACQUISITIONS 
Space-Based Radar 
Effort Needs 
Additional Knowledge 
before Starting 
Development 
Space Radar A defined requirements approval process helps 
decision makers resolve disagreements that may 
occur and ensure they will remain committed to 
their decisions after formal approval. Based on our 
past reports on uncovering problems and our best 
practice work, we believe that the steps in a formal 
approval process include: 
• explaining how decision makers‘ requirements and 
comments are obtained and addressed; 
• identifying the officials and/or the organizations 
responsible for taking specific approval action; 
• establishing a mechanism and time frame for 
providing approval or disapproval; 
• establishing a system for addressing unresolved 
issues as they relate to key program documentation; 
and 
• assessing changes to approved requirements based 
on their effect on the program‘s cost and schedule. 
2004 GAO - DEFENSE 
ACQUISITIONS 
Space-Based Radar 
Effort Needs 
Additional Knowledge 
before Starting 
Development 
 
95 
Space Radar it is expected that some critical SBR technologies 
will not be mature when product development starts, 
that is, not tested in a relevant or operational 
environment. Typical outcomes of this lack of 
knowledge are significant cost and schedule 
increases because of the need to fix problems later in 
development. Furthermore, TCA, a new, more robust 
communications infrastructure that could transmit 
SBR‘s imagery data much more quickly than the 
current infrastructure, is facing uncertainties. 
Specifically, one of TCA‘s primary components, the 
Transformational Satellite, may not be ready in time 
to support SBR.  However, if DOD begins product 
development with less than mature technologies and 
without knowing the availability of TCA, accurate 
cost estimates for SBR will be much more difficult to 
prepare 
2004 GAO - DEFENSE 
ACQUISITIONS 
Space-Based Radar 
Effort Needs 
Additional Knowledge 
before Starting 
Development 
Space, 
Common 
Problems 
requirements definition and control issues 2003 Defense Science Board 
- Acquisition of 
National Security 
Space Programs 
Space, 
Common 
Problems 
Cost has replaced mission success as the primary 
driver in managing acquisition processes, resulting in 
excessive technical and schedule risk 
2003 Defense Science Board 
- Acquisition of 
National Security 
Space Programs 
Space, 
Common 
Problems 
overall underappreciation of the importance of 
appropriately staffed and trained system engineering 
staffs to manage the technologically demanding and 
unique aspects of space programs; Government 
capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition 
process have seriously eroded 
2003 Defense Science Board 
- Acquisition of 
National Security 
Space Programs 
Space, 
Common 
Problems 
The space acquisition system is strongly biased to 
produce unrealistically low cost estimates throughout 
the acquisition process. These estimates lead to 
unrealistic budgets and unexecutable programs; 
widespread lack of budget reserves required to 
implement high risk programs on schedule; 
unhealthy cost bias in proposal evaluation // 
government typically has invested significantly in 
capital and intellectual resources for the incumbent. 
When the incumbent loses, both capital resources 
and the mature engineering and management 
capability are lost. A similar investment must be 
made in the new contractor team. The government 
pays for purchase and installation of specialized 
equipment, as well as fit-out of manufacturing and 
assembly spaces that are tailored to meet the needs of 
the program 
2003 Defense Science Board 
- Acquisition of 
National Security 
Space Programs 
Space, 
Common 
Problems 
While the space industrial base is adequate to 
support current programs, long-term concerns exist; 
Industry has failed to implement proven practices on 
some programs 
2003 Defense Science Board 
- Acquisition of 
National Security 
Space Programs 
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Space, 
Common 
Problems 
requirements for what the satellite needed to do and 
how well it must perform were not adequately 
defined at the beginning of a program or were 
changed significantly once the program had already 
begun. This made it more difficult for programs to 
ensure that they could match their requirements to 
their resources (in terms of money, time, and 
technology). The more requirements were added or 
changed, the more that cost and schedule increased 
• Program did not adequately define requirements 
• Unresolved conflicts among users on requirements 
• Frequent changes made to requirements after 
product development began 
// schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven 
approach; diverse array of organizations with 
competing interests involved in overall satellite 
development, no high-level official within the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense dedicated to developing 
and implementing an overall investment strategy for 
space; attempted to satisfy all requirements in a 
single step, regardless of the design challenge or the 
maturity of technologies to achieve the full capability 
2003 GAO - Military Space 
Operations: Common 
Problems and Their 
Effects on Satellite and 
Related Acquisitions 
Space, 
Common 
Problems 
investment practices were weak. At times, programs 
did not explore potentially more cost-effective 
investment approaches. Once they settled on an 
approach, programs often did not develop realistic 
cost estimates. From a broader perspective, 
investments in programs were not made in 
accordance with an overall space investment strategy 
for DOD. Funds were sometimes shifted from 
healthier programs to pay for weaker ones. Further, 
according to DOD officials, decisions external to the 
program office were sometimes imposed that 
resulted in unexpected funding cuts 
• Program did not adequately analyze investment 
alternatives 
• Cost and/or schedule estimates were optimistic 
• Funding was unstable 
// schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven 
approach; diverse array of organizations with 
competing interests involved in overall satellite 
development, no high-level official within the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense dedicated to developing 
and implementing an overall investment strategy for 
space 
2003 GAO - Military Space 
Operations: Common 
Problems and Their 
Effects on Satellite and 
Related Acquisitions 
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Space, 
Common 
Problems 
acquisition strategies were poorly executed. For 
example, competition was reduced for the sake of 
schedule or DOD did not adequately oversee 
contractors. At times, contract type was not suitable 
for the work being done 
• Level of competition was reduced or eliminated 
• Contract type was not suitable for work being done 
• Poor oversight over contractors 
// schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven 
approach 
2003 GAO - Military Space 
Operations: Common 
Problems and Their 
Effects on Satellite and 
Related Acquisitions 
Space, 
Common 
Problems 
programs did not always ensure that technologies 
were mature before making heavy investments in the 
program. This often caused cost and schedule 
increases due to the need to fix problems later in 
development. A continuing problem is that software 
needs are poorly understood at the beginning of a 
program 
• Technology not sufficiently mature at program start 
• Software needs poorly understood 
• Testing compressed, skipped, or done concurrently 
with production 
// schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven 
approach; attempted to satisfy all requirements in a 
single step, regardless of the design challenge or the 
maturity of technologies to achieve the full capability 
2003 GAO - Military Space 
Operations: Common 
Problems and Their 
Effects on Satellite and 
Related Acquisitions 
Space, 
Common 
Problems 
There are insufficient numbers of technically 
competent and experienced space acquisition 
personnel to execute the responsibilities of the Space 
and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) // The reduced 
availability of government personnel with the 
necessary technical competence has sharply reduced 
the government‘s capability to acquire space systems 
and is believed by many experts to be a major cause 
of acquisition program failures 
2008 Institute for Defense 
Analyses - Leadership, 
Management, and 
Organization for 
National Security 
Space 
Space, 
Common 
Problems 
Lax requirements discipline, technical performance 
problems, cost growth, and schedule delays have 
plagued U.S. space programs // existing leadership 
and management practices have failed to define, 
fund, and execute new satellite programs. Strong 
management is needed to implement proven 
acquisition practices 
2008 Institute for Defense 
Analyses - Leadership, 
Management, and 
Organization for 
National Security 
Space 
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Space, 
Common 
Problems 
leadership for National Security Space is currently 
fragmented and unfocused. Authorities and 
responsibilities are spread across numerous 
organizations, including many within the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) [Under Secretary of 
Defense (USD)/Intelligence; USD/Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics; USD/Policy; and the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)/Networks & 
Information Integration], USAF, USN, USA, USMC, 
DARPA, MDA, and NRO. Although the Secretary of 
the Air Force is the DOD Executive Agent for Space, 
its authorities have been diminished from those 
envisioned by the 2001 Space Commission. 
Moreover, as perceived by many, its stewardship of 
Space does not enjoy the same priority as other 
traditional Air Force missions. The customers who 
use Space capabilities observe that there is no 
responsible official who looks across all the available 
resources and capabilities to seek the best solution, 
whether from the military, intelligence, civilian, or 
commercial sector. This represents a critical need 
2008 Institute for Defense 
Analyses - Leadership, 
Management, and 
Organization for 
National Security 
Space 
TSAT When DOD established initial goals for the TSAT 
program, it lacked sufficient knowledge about key 
critical technologies. Our past work has shown that a 
knowledge-based model leads to better acquisition 
outcomes. This model can be broken down into three 
cumulative knowledge points for technology 
maturity, design maturity, and production maturity. 
At the first knowledge point, a match is made 
between a customer‘s requirements and the product 
developer‘s available resources in terms of technical 
knowledge, time, money, and capacity. We have also 
reported that starting a complex program like TSAT 
with immature technologies can lead to poor 
program performance and outcomes. 
2006 GAO - SPACE 
ACQUISITIONS 
DOD Needs 
Additional Knowledge 
as it Embarks on a 
New Approach for 
Transformational 
Satellite 
 
The table above contains text from the following sources:  (Government Accountability Office, 2010) 
(Government Accountability Office, 2003) (Government Accountability Office, 2004) (Government 
Accountability Office, 2003) (Government Accountability Office, 2005) (Government Accountability 
Office, 2007) (Government Accountability Office, 2009) (Government Accountability Office, 2006) 
(Government Accountability Office, 2003) (Government Accountability Office, 2009) (Government 
Accountability Office, 2006) (Government Accountability Office, 2008) (Institute for Defense Analyses, 
2008) (NPOESS Independent Review Team, 2009) (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003) 
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Appendix D – Recommendations for Space Acquisition Improvement 
The 2003 Defense Science Board report laid out a number of steps necessary to 
correct the space acquisition deficiencies previously discussed.  The combination of 
space acquisition lessons learned and recommendations for improvement were used to 
compose the maturity model.  The report cited the following steps (Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003): 
1. The Under Secretary of the Air Force/Director National Reconnaissance Office 
(USecAF/DNRO) should establish mission success as the guiding principle in all 
space systems acquisition. This requires incorporation of the principle in policy 
statements, leadership actions, and contractual provisions and incentives. 
 
2. The SecDef should establish the same authority for the USecAF for DOD space 
programs as the DNRO has for implementing the National Reconnaissance 
Program (NRP) budget. 
 
3. To ensure realistic budgets and cost estimates, the USecAF/DNRO should 
 
• Direct that space acquisition programs be budgeted to a most probable 
(80/20) cost, with a 20-25 percent management reserve for development 
programs included within this cost; also direct that reserves are not to be 
used for new requirements; 
 
• Direct that source selections evaluate contractor cost credibility and use 
the estimate as a measure of their technical understanding; 
 
• Conduct more effective independent cost estimates and program 
assessments and incorporate the results into the program budget and plan;  
 
• Implement independent senior advisory reviews at critical acquisition 
milestones with experienced, respected outsiders. 
 
4. The USecAF/DNRO should compete space system acquisitions only when 
clearly in the best interest of the government (e.g., new mission capability, major 
new technology, or poor incumbent performance). When a competition occurs 
and a nonincumbent is the winner, the loss of investment in the losing incumbent 
must be reflected in the program budget and plan. In addition, provisions must be 
made to assure continuity between the legacy system and the new system. 
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5. SecDef and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) should designate senior 
leaders in the DOD and intelligence community with authority to lead their 
respective requirements processes for national security space systems. The senior 
leaders must have the support necessary to assess—technically and fiscally— 
proposed requirements and the authority to couple requirements with funding. 
 
6. The USecAF/DNRO should authorize the program manager to control 
requirements within the approved baseline. The program manager should 
continuously trade and challenge requirements throughout the program life cycle. 
Significant requirements changes should require the approval of the senior leaders 
for requirements. 
 
7. The Commander, Air Force Space Command, should complete the ongoing 
effort to establish a dedicated career field for space operations and acquisition 
personnel. 
 
8. The USecAF/DNRO should require that key program management tours be a 
minimum of 4 years. 
 
9. The USecAF/DNRO should, through policy and leadership action, clearly 
define the responsibility, authority, and accountability for program managers, 
recognizing the criticality of program managers to the success of their programs. 
In selecting managers, acquisition experience must be a prerequisite. 
 
10. USecAF/DNRO should develop a robust systems engineering capability to 
support program initiation and development. Specifically, USecAF/DNRO should 
 
• Reestablish organic government systems engineering capability by 
selecting appropriate people from within government, hiring to acquire 
needed capabilities, and implementing training programs; and 
 
• In the near term, ensure full utilization of the combined capabilities of 
government, Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
(FFRDC), and systems engineering and technical assistance (SETA) 
system engineering resources. 
 
11. The USecAF/DNRO should require program managers to identify and report 
potential problems early. 
 
• Program managers should establish early warning metrics and report 
problems up the management chain for timely corrective action. 
 
• Severe and prominent penalties should follow any attempt to suppress 
problem reporting. 
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12. The USecAF/DNRO should demand that national security space contractors 
 
• Account for the quality of their program implementation and for mission 
success, 
 
• Identify proven management and engineering practices and ensure they 
are being utilized, and 
 
• Account for the early identification and open discussion of problems in 
their program. 
 
13. Program managers should align contract and fee structure to focus industry 
attention on proven management and engineering practices and mission success. 
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Appendix E – Excerpts from the Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Guide 
Table 36.  Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Overview (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) 
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Table 37.  Leading Indicator Specification Example (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010) 
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Appendix F – SAIMM Interoperability Measurement Checklist 
Step 1 – Determine Program Interoperation Maturity 
Assess the subject program‘s interoperation maturity for the cost, schedule and 
requirements areas using the SAIMM matrix provided in Chapter III (SAIMM link).  The 
program may tailor the matrix based upon their historical precedent and lessons learned.  
Step 2 – Instantiate the Program Character States 
Place the respective SAIMM scores for each area and attribute into a spreadsheet 
or similar tool.  The following format was used to perform the calculations in this thesis: 
Table 38.  Instantiation Example Format 
 
Step 3 – Perform the Interoperability Measurement 
Apply the SimReal function to the instantiation matrix to perform the 
interoperability measurement.  Set r to 2, and n and cmax to 4. 
Step 4 – Evaluate the Results 
Examine the resulting interoperability scores.  The program may use the AEHF, 
NPOESS and SBIRS examples in this thesis for comparison.  The program may also 
perform the measurement during various phases in the program to evaluate progress.
Program X Mission Focus Stability Discipline Realism
Cost 1 1 1 1
Schedule 1 1 1 1
Requirements 1 1 1 1
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